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THE EU’S CLIMATE AND ENERGY PACKAGE: ENVIRONMENTAL 
INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 
Kati Kulovesi, Elisa Morgera and Miquel Muñoz 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The EU Climate and Energy Package (the Package) is a complex and comprehensive set of 
legal acts aimed at responding to global and EU-wide climate change and energy challenges 
and integrating climate change considerations into a range of sectors and policies. As the 
Package illustrates how the body of legal norms related to climate change is expanding 
rapidly and becoming increasingly specialized, 1  assessing its innovations and broader 
implications from the viewpoint of general EU law becomes more difficult. Not only is the 
Package closely linked to the EU’s position in the negotiations on a future climate change 
regime under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)2 but 
it also features other intertwined international dimensions, ranging from its relationship to 
World Trade Organization (WTO) law3 to the EU’s negotiating position in other multilateral 
fora, such as under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)4 and discussions on ‘green 
growth’ in the lead-up to the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (known as 
“Rio+20”).5 The Package also has significant implications for the EU’s external relations at 
the bilateral level. Against this background, this article analyzes the Package to assess the 
way in which the EU attempts to use its internal legislation to influence international 
processes, on the one hand; and, to assess the influence of international law on EU law, on 
the other hand. While the phenomenon of ‘globalizing’ EU law has not escaped the attention 
of political scientists6 and EU lawyers,7 this article seeks to bring into the spotlight the 
complex interactions between the legal tools that are used to these ends: inwardly, legislative 
choices at EU level;8 and outwardly, reliance on EU law in various multilateral fora and 
bilateral agreements. 
                                                
1 The argument has been made that climate change law is in the process of becoming a distinct legal discipline. 
See  Kulovesi, “Book Review:  The International Climate Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and 
Procedures by Farhana Yamin and Joanna Depledge; and Legal Aspects of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol 
Mechanisms: Making Kyoto Work edited by David Freestone and Charlotte Streck”, XIX Finnish Yearbook of 
International Law (2008), 389-398. 
2  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 Mar. 
1994) 1771 UNTS 107 (UNFCCC). These links are illustrated in Oberthür and Pallemaerts, The New Climate 
Policies of the European Union: Internal Legislation and Climate Diplomacy (VUB Press, 2010), pp. 27-64.  
3 Final Act of the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations (adopted 15 Apr. 1994, entered into force 1 
Jan. 1995) 1867 UNTS 14 (WTO Agreements). 
4 Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 5 Jun. 1992, entered into force 29 Dec. 1993) 1760 UNTS 79 
(CBD). 
5 The General Assembly, at its sixty-fourth session, adopted resolution A/RES/64/236 convening in 2012 a 
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development at the highest possible level, including Heads of State 
and Government or other representatives, with a two-fold focus on the “green economy” in the context of 
sustainable development and poverty eradication; and on the institutional framework for sustainable 
development. 
6 Kelemen, “Globalizing European Union Environmental Policy”, Princeton Annual Workshop on European 
Integration, 1 May 2009, < http://www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/Kelemen.doc> accessed 8 Nov. 2010. Kelemen 
mentions examples related to climate change, GMOs, trade and environment, and chemicals. 
7 de Witte, “International law as a tool for the European Union”, 5 EUConst (2009), 265–283. 
8 See also Vedder, “Diplomacy by Directive: an analysis of the international context of the emissions trading 
directive”  (SSRN Working Paper, SSRN-id 1477371) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1477371>. 
 
THE EU CLIMATE AND ENERGY PACKAGE AT A GLANCE 
At the 2007 Spring European Council, EU Heads of State and Government decided to adopt an integrated 
approach to climate and energy policy in order to transform the EU into a low-emission and highly energy 
efficient economy.i The European Council committed to the objective known as 20-20-20 by 2020,ii which 
consists of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% from 1990 levels,iii increasing the share of renewable 
energy from 8,5% to 20%,iv and improving energy efficiency by 20%, all to be achieved by the year 2020.v At 
the same time, the European Council indicated that the EU would step up its emission reduction commitment to 
30% by 2020 in the context of a comprehensive international climate agreement.vi  
In January 2008, the European Commission proposed a package of measures to implement the 20-20 targets, 
including legislative proposals on emissions trading,vii effort sharing between Member States in non ETS-
sectors,viii renewable energyix and carbon capture and storage.x These measures form a coherent package 
commonly known as the EU Climate and Energy Package.  
The Package was subject to intense negotiations especially during the French EU Presidency during the second 
half of 2008. On 11-12 December 2008, the Package was considered by the European Council resulting in an 
agreement by the Heads of State and Government with some modifications to the initial proposals.xi The 
European Parliament agreed to the Package on 17 December 2008, and, following the co-decision procedure, 
the Council gave the Package the final seal by adopting the new acts on 6 April 2009.xii It entered into force in 
June 2009.  
The main elements of the Package were published in OJ L 140, 5.6.2009. They are:  
• Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing 
Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (hereinafter, Renewables Directive);  
• Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
scheme of the Community (hereinafter, EU ETS Directive);  
• Directive 2009/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending 
Directive 98/70/EC as regards the specification of petrol, diesel and gas-oil and introducing a 
mechanism to monitor and reduce greenhouse gas emissions and amending Council Directive 
1999/32/EC as regards the specification of fuel used by inland waterway vessels and repealing 
Directive 93/12/EEC (hereinafter, Fuel Specification Directive);  
• Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
geological storage of carbon dioxide and amending Council Directive 85/337/EEC, European 
Parliament and Council Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and 
Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 (hereinafter, CCS Directive);  
• Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 setting 
emission performance standards for new passenger cars as part of the Community's integrated approach 
to reduce CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicle (hereinafter, Passenger Car Regulation); and  
• Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse 
gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020 (hereinafter, Effort-sharing Decision). 
i. Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 8-9 March 2007, 7224/1/07, at 10-12 and 19-18 
ii. These slogans are reflected in Commission, “20 20 by 2020 Europe’s Climate Change Opportunity” 
(Communication) COM 2008(30) final, 23 Jan. 2008 
iii. Compared to 1990 levels. 
iv. The 20% energy efficiency goal had been previously established by the 2006 European Action Plan for Energy 
Efficiency, COM(2006)545 final, 19 Dec.2006. 
v. Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 8-9 March 2007, 7224/07, at 12. 
vi. Ibid. 
vii. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to 
improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system of the Community, COM(2008) 16 
final, 23 Jan. 2008.  
viii. Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the effort of Member States to reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 
2020, COM(2008) 17 final, 23 Jan. 2008.  
ix. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of the use of energy from 
renewable sources, COM(2008) 19 final, 23 Jan. 2008.  
x. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the geological storage of carbon dioxide 
and amending Council Directives 85/337/EEC, 96/61/EC, Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 
2006/12/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006, COM(2008) 18 final, Brussels, 23 Jan. 2008.  
xi. Elements of the final compromise regarding the energy and climate change package as agreed by the European 
Council at its meeting on 11 and 12 December 2008, 17215/08, 12 December 2008. 
xii. European Parliament, 17 December 2008. Council of the European Union, 6 April 2009, 8434/09. Available at: 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/107136.pdf>. 
 
The EU Treaty-based requirement of environmental integration will be used as a lens to 
analyse the Package. Environmental integration is one of the general principles of EU law, 
framed in legally binding terms by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TEFU), which provides that environmental protection requirements must be integrated into 
the definition and implementation of the EU’s policies and activities.9 In this article, both the 
external and internal dimensions of environmental integration will be referred to. External 
environmental integration entails that the EU environmental objectives, principles and 
criteria10 are “applied” in other policy areas in the same way as they must be applied in the 
environmental policy: that is, that policy areas other than environmental protection must 
“pursue” the environmental objectives of the EU, “aim at” or “be based on” its environmental 
principles, and “take account of” its environmental criteria. 11  Internal environmental 
integration, in turn, entails that EU environmental law itself is to be construed and interpreted 
broadly, taking into consideration all of the EU environmental objectives, principles and 
criteria,12 basically requiring a holistic approach to EU environmental law-making.13 
 
For present purposes, external environmental integration serves to assess the extent to which 
the Package has contributed to integrating climate change concerns into non-environmental 
                                                
9 Art. 11 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (entered into force 1 Dec. 2009) [2010] OJ 
C83/47 (TFEU) reads: “Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Union policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable 
development.”  
10 Which are expressed in Art. 191 TFEU. 
11 Dhondt, Integration of Environmental Protection into Other EC Policies (Europa Law Publishing, 2003), p. 
84. 
12 Ibid., p. 179, on basis of Joined Cases C-175/98 and C-177/98, Criminal proceedings against Paolo Lirussi 
and Francesca Bizzaro, [1999] ECR I-6881; Joined Cases C-418/97 and C-419/97, ARCO Chemie Nederland 
Ltd v Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer and Vereniging Dorpsbelang Hees, 
Stichting Werkgroep Weurt+ and Vereniging Stedelijk Leefmilieu Nijmegen v Directeur van de dienst Milieu en 
Water van de provincie Gelderland, [2000] ECR I-4475; and Case C-318/98 Criminal proceedings against 
Giancarlo Fornasar, Andrea Strizzolo, Giancarlo Toso, Lucio Mucchino, Enzo Peressutti and Sante 
Chiarcosso, [2000] ECR I-4785, where the Court held broad interpretations EU waste legislation. 
13 For a more detailed discussion, see Morgera, “An introduction to EU environmental law (from the viewpoint 
of international law)”, Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper (forthcoming SSRN 2010). 
EU policies, such as energy and industrial development.14 In that respect, the requirement of 
external environmental integration should guide the enactment of EU secondary legislation, 
which – while not necessarily giving priority to the environmental protection objectives of 
the Treaty15 - requires EU Institutions to systematically take them into account in other policy 
areas16 Internal environmental integration, in turn, serves to assess the extent to which the 
Package takes a holistic approach to environmental protection, ensuring that other sectoral 
environmental initiatives consider climate change implications, and at the same time that 
broader environmental concerns are fully accounted for in devising and implementing climate 
change measures (that is, that climate change response measures are environmentally 
sustainable). Internal environmental integration is gaining importance at the international 
level: the vast majority of multilateral environmental agreements have developed a climate 
change component;17 while the possible negative environmental impacts of some of the 
proposed responses to climate change are increasingly being identified and addressed, with a 
view to proactively ensuring their environmental sustainability.18  
 
Analyzing the Package from the point of view of environmental integration is critical in the 
light of the enormous complexity of climate change as an environmental, economic, social 
and security challenge: greenhouse gas emissions are produced by a multitude of actors, from 
private citizens to multinational corporations, through a wide range of activities. To avoid 
dangerous climate change, significant climate change mainstreaming will be necessary in the 
coming decades. The Package’s objective to make “the European economy a model for 
sustainable development in the 21st century” and commit to an economic transformation 
towards a low-carbon future “requiring major political, social and economic effort,”19 begs 
the question: has the Package succeeded in integrating climate change considerations into a 
range of key sectors, while duly considering potential negative environmental implications of 
climate policies?  
                                                
14 Jans and Vedder, European Environmental Law (Europa Law, 2008), p. 17. 
15 Art. 191(1) TFEU reads as follows: “Union policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of the 
following objectives: preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, protecting human 
health, prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources, promoting measures at international level to deal 
with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change.”  
16 The justiciability of the principle against EU Institutions is discussed by Jans and Vedder, cited supra note 14, 
pp. 20-21, who conclude that “only in very exceptional cases (i.e. manifest error of appraisal) a measures will be 
subject of annulment because certain environmental objectives have not been taken sufficiently into account” 
(on the basis of the Case C-341/95, Gianni Bettati, [1998] ECR I-4355). 
17 See, for instance, the Resolution on Climate Change and Migratory Species (UN Doc UNEP/CMS/Resolution 
8.13, 2005) adopted by the parties to the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals 
(adopted 23 Jun. 1979, entered into force 1 Nov. 1983) 1651 UNTS 333 (Convention on Migratory Species); 
COP Resolution X.24, “Climate Change and Wetlands” (adopted 4 Nov. 2008) by the parties to the Convention 
on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (adopted 2 Feb. 1971, entered into 
force 21 Dec. 1975 ) 996 UNTS 245 (Ramsar Convention); and World Heritage Committee Decision 29COM 
7B.a (adopted 17 Jul. 2005) by the parties to the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural 
and Natural Heritage (adopted 16 Nov. 1972, entered into force 17 Dec. 1975) 1037 UNTS 151 (World Heritage 
Convention). 
18 The CBD, cited supra note 4, has been increasingly addressing the environmental sustainability of response 
measures to climate change, such as ocean fertilization (for which it adopted an implicit moratorium through 
COP Decision IX/16C) and geo-engineering (for which a similar approach will be considered by the Conference 
of the Parties in Oct. 2010 – see SBSTTA Recommendation XIV/5 In-depth review of the work on biodiversity 
and climate change, para 8(w), UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/10/3 (30 Jun. 2010)). Generally on the biodiversity 
impacts of mitigation and adaptation measures, see Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
“Connecting Biodiversity and Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation: Report of the Second Ad Hoc 
Technical Expert Group on Biodiversity and Climate Change” (Technical Series, No. 41, Montreal  2009). 
19 Commission, “20 20 by 2020. Europe’s Climate Change Opportunity" (Communication) COM(2008) 30 
final, 23 Jan. 2008 (hereinafter, CCS Proposal). 
 
To answer to this question, this article starts by sketching the history of EU’s climate policy 
and of the Package. Subsequent sections will discuss key elements of the Package, namely 
changes to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)20 and the Effort Sharing Decision,21 
as well as the Directives on Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)22 and on Renewable Energy,23 
focusing particularly on its sustainability criteria for biofuels. In discussing environmental 
integration, the article will highlight the multifaceted international dimensions of the 
Package: focusing on the interplay between internal and external environmental integration 
will in fact allow to coterminously highlight the interplay between internal and external EU 
law and policy initiatives. These observations pave the way for our conclusions on how the 
Package exemplifies the complex web of internal and external legal tools that the EU uses to 
pursue its climate change objectives while seeking environmental integration. 
21. THE ASCENT OF EU CLIMATE POLICY 
The problem of climate change (or ‘greenhouse effect’ as it was then called) was first 
recognised at the Community level in the late 1980s,24 At that time, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was being created, and the intergovernmental negotiation 
process resulting in the UNFCCC was yet to be launched.25 In response to the 1992 Rio Earth 
Summit’s adoption of Agenda 2126 and the UNFCCC, the EU included climate change as one 
of seven themes in the 1993 Fifth Environment Action Programme.27 In 2002, climate change 
was upgraded to one of four priority action areas in the Sixth Environment Action 
Programme.28 The EU has progressively elevated climate change as a priority in its overall 
agenda on sustainable development and international cooperation, building upon the UN-
driven inclusion of climate change among key threats to global security.29 The high political 
priority given to climate change is now reflected in the TFEU, which highlights climate 
                                                
20 Parliament and Council Directive 2009/29/EC, [2009] OJ L140/63, amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to 
improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community, [2003] OJ 
L275/32 (the EU ETS Directive). 
21 Parliament and Council Decision 406/2009/EC on the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020, [2009] OJ 
L140/136 (Effort-Sharing Decision). 
22 Parliament and Council Directive 2009/31/EC on the geological storage of carbon dioxide and amending 
Council Directive 85/337/EEC, Parliament and Council Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 
2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and Regulation 1013/2006/EC, [2009] OJ L140/114 (CCS Directive). 
23 Parliament and Council Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources 
and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, [2009] OJ L 140/16 
(Renewables Directive).  
24 European Parliament, “Resolution on Measures to Counteract the Rising Concentration of Carbon Dioxide in 
the Atmosphere (the “Greenhouse” Effect)” [1986] OJ C255/272; Communication to the Council on the 
Greenhouse Effect and the Community - Commission Work Programme concerning the Evaluation of Policy 
Options to Deal with the Greenhouse Effect COM(88) 656, 16 Nov. 1988; and Council, “Resolution of 21 Jun. 
1989 on the Greenhouse effect and the Community” [1989] OJ C183/4. For a more detailed overview, see 
Mechling, “Emissions trading and national allocation in the Member States: an Achilles heel of European 
climate policy?”, 5 YEEL(2005), 113-156, at 119-120. 
25 The UNFCCC process was launched by UN General Assembly Resolution 45/212, 21 Dec. 1990. The 
UNFCCC was agreed in 1992 and entered into force in 1994, cited supra note 2. 
26 Agenda 21 – Global Programme of Action on Sustainable Development UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/REV.1, 
vols .I – III, 3 – 14 Jun. 1992 (Agenda 21). 
27 Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, “Towards Sustainability” [1993] 
OJ C138/1, at 42. 
28 Parliament and Council Decision 1600/2002/EC laying down the Sixth Community Environment Action 
Programme, [2002] OJ  L 242, at 1-15. 
29 Morgera and Marín Durán, “The UN 2005 World Summit, the environment and the EU: priorities, promises 
and prospects”, 15 RECIEL (2006), 1-18. 
change among the global environmental issues for which the EU is expected to play a critical 
role at the international level.30 Reading this provision together with the environmental 
integration requirement points to an obligation to mainstream climate change in other EU 
policy areas.31 This legal dimension is coupled with key institutional developments, such as 
the increasing role of the European Council in climate change decision-making at the EU 
level, thus establishing climate change as an issue for EU Heads of State and Government,32 
and the creation of a separate climate change-focused Directorate-General (DG) within the 
European Commission (DG-CLIMA), comprising activities formerly in DG Environment, 
DG External Relations and DG Enterprise and Industry.33 It remains unclear whether the 
securitization of climate change34 will also lead to an involvement in climate politics of the 
High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,35 although the 
European Parliament has already made such a recommendation.36  
 
While these developments have certainly contributed to raising the profile of climate change 
within the EU, the priority attached to climate change has been received with caution and 
possibly concern by leading commentators, who saw a possible risk for achieving internal 
environmental integration: Lee stressed, for instance, that “[p]icking one environmental 
problem (however serious) has to raise certain concerns about ongoing efforts to take a more 
holistic, integrated and sophisticated approach to environmental governance.”37 On the other 
hand, this can be interpreted more positively in terms of external environmental integration, 
as leading to a ‘new phase in environmental governance in the EU’, where climate change as 
a ‘high politics’ environmental issue will bear considerable potential for ‘mutual integration 
of climate change concerns with energy and security policy.’38 
 
The ascent of EU’s climate change policy legislation has been closely linked to the EU’s 
desire to play an international leadership role in the fight against climate change.  Already in 
the early 1990s during negotiations leading to the UNFCCC, the EU (unsuccessfully) pushed 
                                                
30 Art. 191(1) TFEU. 
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Environmental Policy and Law (forthcoming 2010). 
32 Kelly, Oberthür and Pallemaerts, “Introduction” in Oberthür and Pallemaerts, see note 2 supra, pp. 11-25, p. 
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36  The European Parliament called on the EU's High Representative and the Commissioner responsible for 
climate action to lead a new “climate diplomacy” in the European Parliament resolution on the outcome of the 
Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change (10 Feb. 2010), para 7. 
37 Lee, “The environmental implications of the Lisbon Treaty”, 10 Environmental Law Review (2008), 131-138, 
at 133. 
38 von Homeyer, “The evolution of EU environmental governance” in Scott (Ed.), Environmental Protection: 
European Law and Governance (OUP, 2009), pp. 1-26, p. 26. 
for strong international commitments.39 An important step was taken in May 2002 when the 
then European Community and its fifteen Member States ratified the Kyoto Protocol,40 a 
particularly significant move coming a year after the US announced that it would not be 
ratifying the Protocol.41, The EU subsequently sought to show its leadership by creating the 
EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) when the future of the Kyoto Protocol was still 
hanging in balance,42 and used its political clout to secure the Protocol’s entry into force.43 
The Climate and Energy Package can be seen as yet another attempt by the EU to ‘lead by 
example’ at a time when both the legal shape and details of future international climate 
change cooperation under the UNFCCC remain undecided.  
 
With the Package, the EU emphasises that it already has in place the regulatory framework to 
implement key aspects of its climate policy beyond the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment 
period, ending in December 2012. This is a notable achievement, though the 20% by 2020 
emission reduction objective underlying the Package has been criticised by the civil society 
and some developing countries arguing that it is not ambitious enough for the EU to show 
international climate change leadership. After the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in 
Copenhagen failed to bring conclusive results,44 the EU has engaged in internal debates on 
whether it should raise its level of ambition and implement the 30% target. In May 2010, the 
Commission released a communication on possible new policies and measures that would 
need to be added to the Package for the EU to achieve the 30% target by 2020.45 The Council 
was initially expected to make a decision on the 30% target by October 201046 but the 
decision was postponed due to lack of consensus.  
 
While showing leadership in the international climate change negotiations has been a 
prominent driver for the adoption of the Package, it was not the only one. The Package 
responds to multiple concerns within the EU, from energy security47 and long-term economic 
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40 Council Decision 2002/358/EC concerning the approval, on behalf of the European Community, of the Kyoto 
Protocol to the UNFCCC and the joint fulfilment of commitments thereunder, [2002] OJ L130, at 0001 – 0003. 
41 On the US announcement and the Protocol’s birthing difficulties, see Kulovesi, “How to prevent babies from 
being thrown away with the bathwater: Perspectives on the international climate regime from Buenos Aires to 
the future” in Morgera and Francioni (Eds.), The Future of Environmental Law: International and European 
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Papers Law, Law No. 2006/01, 22-27, at 23. 
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42 Ellerman, Convery and de Perthuis, Pricing Carbon. The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 28, 18-19. Ellerman et al. explain that the Commission intended the 
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between the Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS assumed a central role after George W. Bush rejected the Protocol 
in Mar. 2001.   
43 Kulovesi, cited supra note 41, pp. 23-24.  
44 On the Copenhagen outcome, see, for example, “Summary of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference”, 
The Earth Negotiations Bulletin Vol.12, No. 459 (22 Dec. 2009); Rajamani, “Neither fish or fowl”, Seminar 606  
(Feb. 2010), 2-29;  Bodansky, “The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: a post-mortem”, 104(2) AJIL 
(2010), 230-240; Müller, “Copenhagen 2009, failure or final wake-up call for our leaders” (Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies EV 49, Feb. 2010).  
45 Commission, “Analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and assessing 
the risk of carbon leakage” (Communication) COM(2010) 265 final, 26 May 2010.  
46 Council (EU), “Council Conclusions on Climate Change” (3021st Environment Council Meeting, 
Luxembourg, 11 June 2010) 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/115140.pdf> accessed 10 Nov. 
2010.  
47 van Schaik, cited supra note 35, p. 264. 
competitiveness, to trade and development cooperation.48 The basic philosophy underlying 
the Package is that climate change objectives can be achieved while continuing to pursue 
economic prosperity and job-creation within the EU.49 The Package seeks “to put Europe on 
the road to the future” and ensure that by the year 2050, Europe will look “very different” in 
terms of supplying its energy needs.50 According to the Commission, therefore, the transition 
to a low-carbon future can be achieved while continuing to pursue economic growth: the 
Package represents an opportunity to “make climate-friendly policies a major driver for 
growth and jobs in Europe” and for Europe to show that “necessary change can go hand in 
hand with a competitive and prosperous economy fit for the 21st century.”51 Accordingly, the 
EU climate goals significantly shaped the recent “Europe 2020 Strategy” for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth.52 Once again, this has important international dimensions 
that go beyond climate change negotiations, such as for example, the preparatory process for 
the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development.53 
2. UNPACKING THE PACKAGE 
The very fact that the EU decided to adopt a ‘package’ of legislative measures that jointly 
address climate change and energy clearly shows the intention of adopting a comprehensive 
and highly integrated approach. In many respects the Package includes innovative legal 
measures that support not only climate change mainstreaming, but also the environmental 
sustainability of proposed climate change measures (internal environmental integration). In 
addition, the Package seeks to ensure its own effective ‘normative integration’54 into the 
crowded realm of existing EU environmental legislation, by explicitly clarifying linkages 
with other relevant EU legislation and building upon certain pre-existing climate and energy 
initiatives, modifying some and implicitly ensuring the continuance of others.  
 
An understanding of the components of the Package is therefore necessary at this stage. First, 
it contains a revised EU ETS Directive,55 extending and revising the emissions trading 
scheme from 2013 onwards. The EU ETS is the flagship of the EU’s climate policy, capping 
greenhouse gas emissions from energy intensive industrial sectors, currently representing 
approximately 40% of the EU’s total emissions. This is complemented by the Effort-sharing 
Decision, through which the Package introduces binding emission targets for each Member 
State to implement in sectors not included under the ETS. The Package further comprises a 
Directive on Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS),56 which regulates the matter for the first 
time in the EU and provides incentives for pilot activities. The Package also includes a 
Directive on Renewable Energy (Renewables Directive) addressing jointly for the first time 
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52 Commission, “Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” COM(2010) 2020 final, 
3 Mar. 2010; and European Council Conclusions of 17 June 2010. 
53 UN General Assembly, “Implementation of Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of 
Agenda 21 and the outcomes of the World Summit on Sustainable Development” (24 Dec. 2009), UN Doc. 
A/RES/64/236.  
54 This is a different concept than that of the requirement of environmental integration enshrined in Art. 11 
TFEU. Normative integration simply refers to a legislative technique of ensuring clarity in the relationship 
between different relevant legal instruments. For an application in the area of EU water law, see Grimeaud, 
“The EC Water Framework Directive – an instrument for integrating water policy”, 13(1) RECIEL (2004), 27-
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55 Directive 2003/87/EC, cited supra note 20, establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading within the Community in 2003. 
56 CCS Directive, cited supra note 22. 
all forms of renewable energy57 and aiming to increase the share of renewable energy to 20% 
of the total and 10% of energy in the transportation sector.58 59.60The Renewables Directive 
also includes unprecedented sustainability criteria for the production of biofules, and is, in 
this respect, linked to another element of the Package, a revised directive setting 
environmental standards for fuel,61 with a view to facilitating the more widespread blending 
of biofuels into petrol and diesel. 
 
On energy efficiency, the Package includes a Regulation setting the first legally-binding fleet 
standards for CO2 emissions from new passenger cars, whereby Member States agreed to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from passenger cars and achieve average fleet emissions of 
130 grams of carbon dioxide per kilometre in 2015.62 It should be noted that the target to 
enhance energy efficiency by 20% by 2020 pre-dates the Package, and the basis for related 
measures can be found in the 2006 European Action Plan for Energy Efficiency.63 Thus, 
while most energy efficiency measures are technically not part of the Package (and will not 
be addressed in this article), they are intrinsically linked to it. Overall, the Commission has 
estimated that the Action Plan for Energy Efficiency will lead to significant and cost-
effective greenhouse gas emission reductions by 2020, thereby directly contributing to the 
objectives of the Package.64 It should also be noted that the Package includes amended 
guidelines on state aid for environmental measures, which were adopted by the Commission 
in 2008.65 While this article does not address the guidelines, they are certainly important in 
facilitating Member State action and make an interesting case study for analysing 
environmental integration in EU competition law. Turning now to the environmental 
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63 COM(2006) 545 final, 19 Oct. 2006. 
64 In 2009-2010, measures were passed known as the “energy efficiency package,” and included: Parliament and 
Council Regulation (EC) 1222/2009 (25 Nov. 2009) on the labeling of tires with respect to fuel efficiency and 
other essential parameters, [2009] OJ L342/46; Parliament and Council Directive 2010/31/EU (19 May 2010) 
on the energy performance of buildings [2010] OJ L153/13; and Parliament and Council Directive 2010/30/EU 
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65 Oberthür and Pallemaerts, cited supra note 32, p. 47. Community guidelines on State aid for environmental 
protection (2008/C 82/01), [2008] OJ C82; See also “State aid: guidelines on state aid for the environment – 
frequently asked questions” (Press Release) MEMO/08/31 (23 Jan.2008) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/31&format=HTML&aged=0&language=
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integration and international dimensions of the key elements of the Package, the EU ETS 
Directive will be addressed first.  
3. THE EU ETS 
The EU ETS is the world’s most important greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme.66 It is a 
cap-and-trade scheme, covering more than 12,000 operators. By creating a price for 
greenhouse gas emissions, the EU ETS has attempted to integrate climate change 
considerations into the strategic thinking of the covered economic sectors and, at least in 
theory, created an incentive for business to start investing in low-carbon technologies.67 
Having internalized some climate change costs into sectors such as power generation, iron 
and steel, refineries, cement and other building materials, as well as pulp and paper,68 the 
ETS can also be seen as a critical tool for implementing the external dimension of the 
environmental integration principle.69 All this is in line with messages from the Fourth 
Assessment Report by the IPCC and the Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change 
that introducing a price for greenhouse gas emissions is one of the most effective ways to 
mitigate climate change.70 At the international level, the EU is hoping that the ETS will 
inspire other countries to establish similar schemes and to expand the global carbon market 
through interlinked emissions trading schemes, first within countries belonging to the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and later including other 
major economies.71 According to the Commission’s vision, the OECD-wide market would be 
driven by a transatlantic carbon market, created by linking the EU ETS to a future 
greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme in the US.72 This section begins with a brief 
overview of the ETS and the key reforms introduced by the Package. It then analyses the ETS 
in the international context, focusing on its relevance for the EU’s climate change leadership 
and its relationship with international law, including the UNFCCC and the WTO. 
A. Overview of the EU ETS 
The ETS marked a U-turn in the EU’s attitude towards carbon trading and market-based 
instruments. During the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, prior to 1997, the EU and developing 
countries opposed market-based mechanisms, which were favoured by the US and other 
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World Bank, Washington D.C., May 2009), 1-2. 
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71 Commission, “EU Action Against Climate Change. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme” (2008) 
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72 Delbek, “Environmental policy in times of economic crisis - the example of the EU ETS” (European 
Commission, Presentation at the Adam Smith Prize 2009, Rotes Rathaus, Berlin 29 May 2009) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/speech_berlin_290509.pdf> accessed 8 Nov. 2010. 
developed countries in the coalition known as the Umbrella Group.73 As part of the final deal, 
carbon-trading was included in the Protocol under the so-called flexibility mechanisms: the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and Emissions Trading. 
Following the adoption of the Protocol the EU debated about the pros and cons of emissions 
trading74 and in 2000, the Commission’s Green Paper already implied that a Community-
wide emissions trading scheme would be established.75  
 
The ETS applies to the 27 EU Member States, Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. Operators 
covered by the ETS must hold a permit to engage in activities covered by the Directive. A 
competent national authority issues the permit after it is satisfied that the operator is capable 
of monitoring and reporting its emissions.76 Each year, operators must surrender allowances 
(EU Allowances, EUAs) corresponding to their monitored and verified greenhouse gas 
emissions during the previous year. Operators whose emissions are below their quota may 
sell their excess allowances. In contrast, operators whose emissions exceed their quota must 
purchase allowances to cover their excess emissions as failure to surrender allowances results 
in a penalty of !100 per EUA.77 Each Member State has a national greenhouse gas registry, 
in other words, an electronic database where the creation, transfer and surrender of EUA are 
registered. There is also a central registry in Brussels, still known as the Community 
Independent Transaction Log (CITL).78  
 
The first “learning-by-doing” Phase of the ETS ran from 2005 to 2007, with a focus on 
setting up the necessary institutions and procedures.79 Phase II, 2008-2012, runs in parallel 
with the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol and plays an important role in 
ensuring that the EU and its Member States comply with the Kyoto target.80 Phase III of the 
ETS - as amended through the Package - will take place between 2013 and 2020 regardless of 
developments at the international level.81 In order to improve its cost-effectiveness, the ETS 
is linked to the two project-based flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM and 
JI.82 This means that operators participating in the ETS may use credits from the CDM and JI 
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74 Commission, “Preparing for implementation of the Kyoto Protocol” (Communication) COM(1999) 230 final, 
19 May 1999 and “Emissions trading within the European Community” (Green Paper) COM(2000) 87 final, 8 
Mar. 2000. 
75 Ellerman et al, see note 42 supra, p. 21. 
76 Permit conditions and procedures are coordinated with Directive 96/61/EC concerning Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control (IPPC) [1996] OJ L257. 
77 This penalty applies during the second trading period. During the first period, it was lower, ! 40 per EUA. 
Each EUA corresponds to one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent. As the price of EUA in the first half of 2010 
was in the 10-20! range, there is a clear incentive for installations to purchase EUAs rather than face the 
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78  The website of the CITL can be accessed at: <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/> accessed 8 Nov. 2010.  
79 Some of the key challenges during the first trading period included the identification of covered installations, 
organizing public consultations and lack of verified emissions data, which resulted in over-allocation of 
allowances. 
80 For the second trading period, emissions in the EU ETS sector have been capped at around 6.5 % below their 
levels in 2005. 
81 Some of the main questions for international climate policy include the continuity of the Kyoto Protocol 
beyond its first commitment period in 2012 and the ways of engaging the US and major emitting developing 
countries, such as China, in climate change mitigation efforts. For an overview, see Kulovesi and Gutierrez, 
“Climate change negotiations update: Process and prospects for an agreed outcome in Copenhagen in December 
2009”, 18(3) Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (2009), 229-243. 
82 Given the uncertain fate of the Kyoto Protocol in 2003 when Directive 2003/87/EC (cited supra note 20) was 
adopted the link between the ETS and the Kyoto Mechanisms was done subsequently by Directive 2004/101/EC 
to comply with their emissions allocations. The main motivation was to enable companies to 
take advantage of the cost-efficient mitigation opportunities in developing countries and 
countries in transition to a market economy.  
 
In terms of external environmental integration, the amended Directive extends the sectors 
covered by the EU ETS, notably adding the chemical industry, and the aviation sector, as 
well as more activities under the previously included energy, metal, mineral and paper 
sectors.83 Of particular interest is the decision to include in the ETS emissions from all flights 
taking off and landing in the EU from 2012 onwards.84 This can be seen as a response to a 
long-standing impasse under the UNFCCC on whether and under which international forum 
to take action on emissions from international aviation and maritime transport (bunker fuels). 
For the purposes of our analysis, the EU unilateral action on aviation emissions illustrates 
how the environmental integration requirement links with the international relevance of the 
ETS: the EU is attempting to integrate climate change considerations into the aviation sector 
whose rapidly growing emissions could offset the impact of mitigation in other sectors.85 At 
the same time, the EU is seeking to influence international behaviour in the aviation sector, 
and the fact that the scheme will apply to non-European airlines has been subject to protests 
and even legal action.86 Overall, however, the ETS is often (but not universally) perceived as 
a success in that it has introduced a price for greenhouse gas emissions from energy intensive 
sectors in the EU, thereby sending a price signal for business to start investing in low-carbon 
technologies and mainstreaming climate change considerations into their strategies.87  
B. The Package and Effectiveness of the ETS 
Regardless of the dominant view of the ETS as an important example of the EU’s global 
climate change leadership, the effectiveness of the Scheme has been subject to a debate,88 
which is relevant in assessing the extent to which environmental integration is actually 
                                                                                                                                                  
amending Directive 2003/87/EC (“Linking Directive”) [2004] OJ L338/18. The EU has adopted stricter 
requirements concerning certain CDM project types, for instance, it does not allow credits from sink projects 
and only accepts credits from small-scale hydro power projects. It does, however, accept industrial gases. 
83 For a detailed listing, see Annex I, Directive 2009/29/EC, cited supra note 20 above. 
84 Parliament and Council Directive 2008/101/EC (19 Nov. 2008) amending Directive 2003/87/EC, cited supra 
note 20, so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within 
the Community, [2009] OJ L8/3. 
85 See also links with multilateral negotiations within the International Civil Aviation Organization in Vedder, 
cited supra note 8, at 7. Note that the 37th Session of the Assembly adopted a comprehensive resolution to 
reduce the impact of aviation emissions on climate change, ICAO, “ICAO Member States agree to historic 
agreement on aviation and climate change” (Press release, 8 Oct. 2010) 
<http://www2.icao.int/en/Assembly37newsroom-
public/Documents/ICAO%20Member%20States%20Agree%20To%20Historic%20Agreement%20On%20Avia
tion%20And%20Climate%20Change.pdf> accessed 11 Nov. 2010. 
86 The International Air Transport Association (IATA) protested the EU’s decision to include aviation emissions 
in the ETS in the middle of the global economic crisis. See IATA, “IATA blasts European Union ETS decision” 
(Press Release, No. 50, 24 Oct. 2008) <http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2008-10-24-02.aspx> accessed 
11 Nov. 2010. At the end of 2009, American Airlines, Continental Airlines and United Airlines backed by the 
US Airtransport Association, challenged the inclusion of non-European airlines in the ETS before British courts. 
See also Petersen, “The legality of the EU’s stand-alone approach to the climate impact of aviation: the express 
role given to the ICAO by the Kyoto Protocol”, 17(2) RECIEL (2008), 196-204. 
87 For an example of a largely positive evaluation, see Ellerman et al., cited supra note 42.  
88 For a recent critical assessment of the data concerning 2009 emissions, see Sandbag, “Rescuing the EU ETS 
from Redundancy” (Briefing Paper) < 
http://www.sandbag.org.uk/site_media/pdfs/reports/Rescuing_EU_ETS.pdf > accessed 8 Nov. 2010. The paper 
argues that after five years, the ETS has “failed to constrain the annual supply of carbon across capped sectors 
for any year except 2008,” and given the significant drop in emissions in 2009 due to the recession, phase II of 
the ETS could “allow emissions to grow with no further need for domestic abatement until 2017 or later.” 
supported by this legal tool. One of the key debates has concerned the strictness of the 
emissions cap and the method of allocating EUAs to the participating installations. In theory, 
the two main choices for allocating allowances are so-called grandfathering (whereby 
allowances are distributed free of charge based on historical emissions) and auctioning 
(whereby participating installations are required to purchase the necessary allowances). 
During its first two phases, the ETS has mainly used grandfathering with the vast majority of 
EUAs allocated for free through National Allocation Plans (NAPs) drawn up by each 
Member State and notified to the Commission.89 Essentially, the Member State decided the 
overall amount of allowances and the criteria for allocating them during each of the first two 
trading periods, with the Commission having the power to reject a NAP or a part of it. As the 
effectiveness and desirability of this method was subject to debate,90 the method of allocating 
EUAs was one of the key reforms to the ETS brought about by the Package. National 
emissions caps determined by the Member States will be replaced by an EU-wide emissions 
cap defined in the Directive that decreases in a linear manner by a factor of 1.74%.91 
According to the Commission, this reform “provides a long-term perspective and increased 
predictability, which is required for long-term investments in efficient abatement.” 92 
Furthermore, auctioning will become the basic principle of allocation. According to the 
Commission’s original proposal in January 2008, auctioning was to become the norm for the 
power sector from 2013 onwards,93 but some limited exceptions were adopted as a last-
minute compromise to ensure support for the Package by some of the new Member States.94 
For industrial installations, auctioning will be gradually increased during Phase III, starting at 
30% in 2013, and reaching 70% in 2020 and 100% in 2027.95In those cases where allowances 
are not auctioned, they will be allocated based on harmonized rules.96  
 
However, less than two years after the negotiations of the Package, the environmental 
effectiveness of the ETS is once again being debated.97 Because of the global economic 
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Directive 2008/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system of the 
Community” COM(2008) 16 final, 23 Jan. 2008, at 7. In 2010, the Commission is developing rules on how 
auctioning will work in practice, including the timing of the auctions, volume of allowances to be auctioned and 
so on. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Directive 2009/29/EC, cited supra note 20, preambular para 19 and Art. 10(c). 
95 Ibid., preambular para. 21. The Commission originally proposed to reach full auctioning in these sectors by 
2020. 
96 Ibid., Art. 10(a). 
97 Another issue that could compromise the effectiveness of the EU ETS is the use of international offsets. For 
example, in 2009, while credits from international offsets accounted for only 4.3% of credits surrendered under 
downturn, emissions in the sectors covered by the ETS have decreased more rapidly than 
expected - verified emissions under the ETS in 2009 were 11.6% below 2008 emissions and 
carbon prices fell correspondingly, with a drop in early 2009 from some !25 to !8 per EUA.98 
This has provoked criticism that the cap is too lax and that the ETS does not provide 
incentives for operators to make structural investments to reduce their emissions.99 In May 
2010, the Commission acknowledged that the economic analysis underlying the Package was 
no longer valid and suggested “recalibrating” the ETS by setting aside EUAs originally 
intended for auction.100 It remains to be seen what course of action - if any - the Member 
States will choose to take in response to the Commission’s proposals.101102 For present 
purposes, this seems to indicate that ensuring effective incorporation of climate change 
considerations into decision-making by the covered sectors (external environmental 
integration) can be a challenging task. In other words, during its first two trading periods, the 
ETS has struggled to set the cap at a level that would provide an effective price signal  - first 
because of lack of reliable information on past emissions and then due to unforeseen impacts 
of the global economic downturn. This means that the effectiveness of the ETS during the 
third trading period is once again questionable.  
C. International Dimensions of the ETS: Climate Finance, Carbon Leakage and 
Expanding the Global Carbon Market 
One of the key issues in the negotiations under the UNFCCC relates to finance for mitigation 
and adaptation actions in developing countries,103 which is also linked to questions of internal 
environmental integration. It has been estimated that such financing needs will amount to 
billions of euros per year by 2020.104  In its proposal to amend the EU ETS and make 
auctioning the default method of allocation, the Commission suggested using a proportion of 
auctioning revenues: 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
the ETS, the share of hydrofluorocabon (HFC)-related credits accounted for 59% of all CERs surrendered under 
the ETS. Elsworth and Worthington, “International Offsets and the EU 2009. An update on the usage of 
compliance offsets in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme” (Sandbag Climate Campaign Report, July 2009) 
<http://www.sandbag.org.uk/site_media/pdfs/reports/offset2009.pdf> accessed 11 Nov. 2010. HFC credits have 
been qualified as a “loophole” and “market distortion” to the CDM and carbon markets. See, “Kyoto Protocol 
‘loophole’ has cost $6 billion” Newscientist (9 Feb. 2007) <http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11155-
kyoto-protocol-loophole-has-cost-6-billion.html> accessed 11 Nov. 2010 and Wara, “Is the global carbon 
market working?” 445 Nature (2007),595-596. 
98 Europa, “EU ETS: Emissions fall more than 11% in 2009” (Press Release) IP/10/576, 18 May 2010. 
99 Sandbag briefing paper, cited supra note 88.  
100 According to the Commission, the cost of complying with the -20% target is now estimated at !48 billion 
rather than the previously estimated “at least !70 billion.” Commission Communication, cited supra note 45.  
101 In June 2010, the Council concluded that the Commission’s communication covers a wide range of issues 
which need to be discussed in-depth in order to prepare the EU for the medium- and longer-term climate change 
challenges, and agreed to “to revert to these issues as soon as possible and in any case no later than at its 
October 2010 session.” COEU, “Analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions 
and assessing the risk of carbon leakage” (Environment Council Conclusions, 14 Jun. 2010, 11028/10) 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st11028.en10.pdf> accessed 8 Nov. 2010. 
102 European industry formally opposes the unilateral 30% target. ACEI, “Open Letter” (21 Jan. 2010) 
<http://www.euratex.org/system/files/attached-files/100121+ACE+Open+Letter.pdf> accessed 11 Nov. 2010. 
103 For the main outstanding points in the climate change negotiations, see, for instance, Jinnah, Bushey, Muñoz 
and Kulovesi,., “Tripping points: barriers and bargaining chips on the road to Copenhagen”, 4(3) Environmental 
Research Letters (5 Aug. 2009), <http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/4/3/034003/pdf/1748-
9326_4_3_034003.pdf> accessed 8 Nov. 2010 and Kulovesi and Gutierrez, see note 81 supra.  
104 For updated estimates, see UNFCCC Secretariat, “Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate 
Change – Update” (Mar. 2009).  
 … to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, to adapt to the impacts of climate change, to 
fund research and development for reducing emissions and adapting, to develop 
renewable energies to meet the EU’s commitment to using 20% renewable energies 
by 2020, for the capture and geological storage of greenhouse gases, to contribute to 
the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund, for measures to avoid 
deforestation and facilitate adaptation in developing countries, and for addressing 
social aspects such as possible increases in electricity prices in lower and middle 
incomes.105 
 
The Commission originally proposed that “at least 20%” of the revenues generated from the 
auctioning of allowances under the ETS should be used for activities related to climate 
change mitigation and adaptation.106 The final version refers to “at least 50%” of the 
auctioning revenues or “the equivalent value of these revenues,” leaving the Member States 
discretion to decide how to spend the auctioning revenues.107 Additions and specifications 
were also made to the list of possible activities, including references to the Kyoto Protocol 
Adaptation Fund, technology transfer, as well as afforestation and reforestation activities in 
developing countries. The chosen approach arguably reflects internal environmental 
integration to the extent that auctioning revenues generated under the ETS will be used to 
pursue a holistic approach to climate change mitigation and adaptation, by funding activities 
to avoid or mitigate adverse environmental impacts on biodiversity from CCS and 
deforestation, or to promote ecosystem-based adaptation. The overall idea of using climate 
financing for an integrated implementation of different multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) is put forward by the EU also in international fora: for instance, the EU 
argues that climate financing should be used to achieve both climate change and biodiversity 
objectives.108 
 
Considering the international dimension of the climate finance provisions in the ETS, it can 
be asked whether they are ambitious enough for the EU to assert global leadership in this 
area. Within the EU, the question of finance was subject to an internal debate throughout 
2009. The lack of decisive position in the negotiations leading up to Copenhagen provoked 
criticism especially from civil society and the EU was accused of “putting a global climate 
deal at risk and threatening the lives of millions of the world’s poorest.”109 In the autumn 
2009, the Commission published a blueprint for climate finance, estimating that “finance 
requirements for adaptation and mitigation in developing countries could reach roughly !100 
billion a year by 2020.”110 This would mean “international public funding in the range of !22 
                                                
105 COM(2008) 16 final,  cited supra note 92, Art. 10(3), at 22-23. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Directive 2009/29/EC, cited supra note 20, Art. 10.3. 
108 COEU, “EU and global vision and targets and international ABS regime”, (Environment Council 
Conclusions, 16 Mar. 2010) <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st07/st07536.en10.pdf> accessed 8 
Nov. 2010, para 19, indicating that “public and private finance, including innovative forms of financing, and 
finance associated with the Copenhagen Accord on climate change, should - based on appropriate criteria - 
include scope for payments for ecosystem services, where appropriate, including for both adaptation and 
mitigation, and should specifically support conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity within REDD-plus, 
as appropriate, through the implementation of negotiated safeguards.” 
109 Oxfam, “EU climate approach puts world’s poorest people at peril” (Press Release, 2 March 2009) 
<http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressrelease/2009-03-02/eu-climate-approach-puts-worlds-poorest-at-
peril> accessed 8 Nov. 2010. 
110 Commission, “Stepping up international climate finance: A European blueprint for the Copenhagen deal” 
(Communication) COM(2009) 475/3, X 2009. The Commission further specified that domestic private and 
public finance could deliver between 20-40%, the carbon market up to around 40%, and international public 
finance could contribute to cover the remainder. 
to 50 billion per year in 2020,” of which the EU’s share would be approximately between 10-
30%.111 On meeting this funding requirement through auctioning revenues from the ETS, the 
Commission estimates: 
 
Whilst it is difficult to be precise about the future carbon price and therefore the size 
of auctioning revenues, it is estimated that if the EU was required to finance !3 billion 
in 2013 – the upper end of the scale – this would account for between 7 and 20% of 
total auction revenues. It would therefore be well covered by the revenues flowing 
into government treasuries from climate change policies.112 
 
In November 2009, the Council agreed to endorse these Commission’s financing estimates 
but without specifying the EU’s share.113 In Copenhagen, the EU pledged !7.2 billion of fast-
track financing for a three-year period in 2010-2012 and is currently negotiating with 
recipient countries on how to implement this.114 Negotiations on the long-term financing 
framework under the UNFCCC are continuing with the UN Secretary-General’s High-level 
Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing115 being in the process of identifying possible 
funding sources. Overall, while the EU has attempted to play a constructive role concerning 
climate finance, divides persist between the EU and other developed countries on one side, 
and developing countries on the other, concerning the role of public financing in addressing 
climate change.116 
 
D. Carbon Leakage 
Another key international issue concerning the ETS in the Package relates to carbon leakage. 
Carbon leakage refers to a situation where mitigation policies affecting one economic sector 
or country may lead to growth of emissions in other sectors or countries. As explained above, 
the EU took a decision to launch the ETS and introduce a price for carbon dioxide emissions 
during one of ‘the darkest moments’ of international climate policy. This gave rise to 
concerns over competitiveness of the European industries: the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol are based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, and at 
present, non-Annex I countries, including China, India, Brazil, South Africa and other 
emerging economies, are not required to control the growth of their greenhouse gas 
emissions. Furthermore, the US never ratified the Kyoto Protocol and does not intend to do 
so.117 This means that emitting greenhouse gases has no monetary cost outside the EU. 
Addressing concerns over competitiveness and introducing measures aimed at preventing 
                                                
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid.  
113 Council, “Presidency Conclusions” 15265/1/09 Rev 1, 1 Dec. 2009.   
114 This is in line with the (unadopted) Copenhagen Accord, which included agreement by developed countries 
to provide “new and additional resources, including forestry and investments through international institutions, 
approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010-2012.” Agreement was also reached that “in the context of 
meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, developed countries commit to a goal of 
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text of the Copenhagen Accord, see UNFCCC, (30 Mar. 2010) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, annex to 
Decision 2/CP.15. 
115 For information on the Group’s work, see: 
<http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/climatechange/pages/financeadvisorygroup>. 
116 “Summary of the Tianjin climate change talks” The Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 485 (12 Oct. 
2010) <http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12485e.html> accessed 8 Nov. 2010. 
117 For a recent statement by the US under the UNFCCC that it “is not party to the Kyoto Protocol and does not 
intend to become such,” see The Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 466 (5 Jun. 2010) 
<http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12466e.html> accessed 8 Nov. 2010. 
carbon leakage formed therefore an important part of the Climate and Energy Package. 
According to the Commission: 
 
In the event that other developed countries and other major emitters of greenhouse 
gases do not participate in an international agreement that will achieve the objective 
of limiting global temperature increase to 2°C, certain energy-intensive sectors and 
sub-sectors in the Community subject to international competition could be exposed 
to the risk of carbon leakage. This could undermine the environmental integrity and 
benefit of actions by the Community.118 
 
In 2009, the Commission determined sectors exposed to carbon leakage based on the criteria 
listed in the ETS Directive adopted as a part of the Package.119  
 
The key to preventing carbon leakage in the Package is that sectors exposed to carbon 
leakage will continue to receive 100% of their allowances free of charge. In its proposal, the 
Commission also mentioned the possibility of establishing “an effective carbon equalisation 
system” with the view of putting EU installations on a comparable footing with those from 
third countries.120 The system would essentially mean requiring those importing energy-
intensive products to the EU to purchase allowances corresponding to their greenhouse gas 
emissions during the manufacturing of the product. Final decision on the possible further 
measures to address carbon leakage was postponed pending the outcome of the UN Climate 
Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009.121 The Directive requested the 
Commission to review the situation in light of the outcome of the international negotiations, 
prepare a report by June 2010 and make “appropriate proposals,” such as “inclusion in the 
Community scheme of importers of products” in sectors that are exposed to a significant risk 
of carbon leakage.122 This proposal has provoked criticism with concerns having been raised 
over its compatibility with WTO law123 and with the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities under the UNFCCC.124 
 
In its report in May 2010, the Commission noted that given the uncertainties surrounding 
international climate policy,125 the measures already included in the Package to address 
carbon leakage - free allowances and access to international offsets - remain justified.126 The 
                                                
118 COM(2008) 16, cited supra note 92.  
119Commission Decision of 24 Dec. 2009 determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC, cited supra note 20, a 
list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage, [2010] OJ 
L1, at 10–18. 
120 COM(2008) 16, cited supra note 92. 
121 It was agreed that the Commission should review the situation with respect to carbon leakage by 30 Jun. 
2010. See preambular para 26 and Art.10(b) of Directive 2009/29/EC, cited supra note 20. On the inconclusive 
outcome of the Copenhagen Conference, cited supra note 44.  
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123 Dhar and Das, “The European Union’s proposed carbon equalization system: Can it be WTO Compatible?” 
(Research and Information System for Developing Countries Discussion Paper # 156, 25 Nov. 2009) 
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developed countries like the EU. 
125 On the hurdles in Copenhagen, see “Summary and Analysis” Earth Negotiations Bulletin, cited supra note 
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126 COM(2010) 265 final, cited supra note 45. In case the EU decides to step up its efforts and implement the -
30% target, the Commission identifies the maintenance of free allocation of allowances to exposed sector as 
“the most obvious way to provide further help. 
Commission also addressed the possibility of including imports into the ETS, noting that 
similar proposals have been discussed in the US and that “obviously it would be desirable for 
such initiatives to be taken together with such partners.”127 The Commission highlights, 
however, concerns voiced by emerging economies over such plans and draws attention to 
“broader issues about the EU’s trade policy and its overall interest in an open trade 
system.” 128  The Commission also acknowledges problems concerning the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities under the UNFCCC if developed and developing 
countries are treated in the same way in terms of climate change mitigation. 129  The 
Commission stresses the need to design such measures carefully in order to ensure their 
compatibility with WTO law and also draws attention to potential administrative difficulties 
arguing that “it would seem challenging to verify the performance of individual installations 
in third countries without a highly sophisticated monitoring and reporting system in place at 
installation level.”130 As an alternative, the Commission raises the possibility of “a more 
targeted approach to the nature and recognition of international credits in the ETS,” 
mentioning a possible pilot for EU/China sectoral crediting on steel and highlights 
technology transfer as another means of helping emerging economies to close a competitive 
gap.131  
 
The discussion on carbon leakage illustrates the prominent international dimension of the 
Package.  The Commission is acutely aware of the close link between the carbon leakage 
provisions in the revised EU ETS Directive and the WTO regime, and the potential 
challenges that could follow from a decision to include some energy-intensive imported 
products under the ETS.132 The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities under the UNFCCC also plays a role in designing the EU’s legislation 
on carbon leakage and the Commission highlights the need to consider, in particular, the 
situation of Least Developed Countries.133 From the point of view of legislative technique, it 
is certainly interesting - even unusual - that a close and explicit connection is made between 
the outcome of international negotiations and possible changes to domestic legislation. In 
other words, possible further action on carbon leakage is explicitly linked in the operative 
text of the Directive to the outcome of negotiations on the future climate regime under the 
UNFCCC. 134  From a broader perspective, the interplay between European law and 
international law concerning carbon leakage could also be seen as supporting the argument 
made elsewhere that climate change law is emerging as a new legal discipline blurring the 
distinctions between international, regional and domestic law.135 
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129 Ibid.  
130 Ibid.  
131 Ibid.  
132 Ibid., at 12. See also COM(2008) 16, cited supra note 92, at 8.  
133 COM(2008) 16, cited supra note 20, at 8.  
134 See Directive 2009/29/EC, cited supra note 20, Art. 28(1), according to which, three months upon the 
approval of a future international climate change agreement leading to the EU undertaking mandatory emission 
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135 See Kulovesi, see note 1 supra. 
 E. Linking Emission Trading Schemes 
The international dimensions of the ETS are not limited to climate finance and carbon leakage. As 
discussed above, the decision to adopt the ETS was linked to the EU’s desire to play a global 
leadership role in the battle against climate change and the ETS is seen “an important building block 
for the development of a global network of emission trading systems.”136 In other words, the EU is 
hoping that the ETS will help to expand the global carbon market through interlinked emissions 
trading schemes, first within countries belonging to the OECD and later including other major 
economies.137 Interestingly, the EU effort to support the creation of a global carbon market is also 
featuring more and more prominently in the EU bilateral external relations.138 The Package introduced 
some reforms to facilitate the EU’s ambition to expand the global carbon market.  
 
In its original form, the ETS Directive allowed for linking the ETS with schemes in other 
industrialised countries having ratified the Kyoto Protocol.139 Due to the fact that the US will 
not ratify the Kyoto Protocol,140 new provisions were added to the ETS Directive, making it 
possible to recognise allowances from “compatible” and “mandatory” emissions trading 
schemes with absolute emission caps in “any other country” or “sub-federal or regional 
entities”141 The language is such that it would enable linking the ETS with either a federal or 
regional emissions trading scheme in the US. From the US domestic perspective, both 
alternatives remain open.142 From a global perspective, a link between the ETS and a federal 
emissions trading scheme in the US would have important implications: not only would it be 
“a strong political signal for the creation of a global carbon market, but would eliminate 
competitive concerns between these two players caused by different carbon prices.”143 The 
scheme would also provide “the backbone for the overall international climate regime, with 
subsequent enlargements to other developed and developing countries.”144 Also other OECD 
countries, such as Australia, New Zealand and Japan are considering or have already 
launched national greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes. For this reason, the new 
provisions in the ETS Directive concerning links with other greenhouse gas emissions trading 
schemes highlight the international dimension and relevance of the Package.  
                                                
136 Europa, “Questions and Answers on the revised EU Emissions Trading System” (Press Release) 
Memo/08/796 (17 Dec. 2008).  
137 “EU Action Against Climate Change…”, cited supra note 71. 
138 For instance, according to the Joint Statement resulting from the Fifth Summit between the EU and the 
Republic of Korea, “EU-Republic of Korea, Joint Press Statement” (Brussels, 6 Oct. 2010), leaders noted that 
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Nov. 2010. 
139 Directive 2003/87/EC, cited supra note 20, Art. 25, providing that “Agreements should be concluded with 
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140 See The Earth Negotiations Bulletin, cited supra note 117.  
141 Article 25 paragraph 1a of Directive 2009/29/EC.  
142 Although plans to establish a federal cap-and-trade scheme have been frozen at least until 2013. See, Gerrad, 
“Climate regulation without congressional action”, New York Law Journal (New York 6 Oct. 2010) 244(68) 
<http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202472923986> accessed 9 Nov. 2010. 
143 Abstract in Strek, Mehling and Turek, “Prospects of Linking EU and US Emission Trading Schemes: 
Comparing the Western Climate Initiative, the Waxman-Markey and Lieberman-Warner Proposals” (Climate 
Strategies, April 2009) <http://www.climatestrategies.org/component/reports/category/33/143.html> accessed 9 
Nov. 2010.  
144 Ibid.  
4. THE EFFORT-SHARING DECISION 
 As mentioned above, the ETS Directive is complemented by the Effort-sharing Decision,145 
which is also significant both from an internal and external environmental integration 
perspective. For sectors not covered by the ETS and representing approximately 60% of the 
EU’s greenhouse gas emissions, the Effort-Sharing Decision introduces a national emission 
target for each Member State during the period 2013-2020. In average, the reduction in the 
sectors covered by the Effort Sharing Decision will be 10% from 2005 levels by 2020 (see 
Figure 1). According to the Decision, the national target for each Member State was 
determined through a process seeking to reflect fairness, with targets set as a function of the 
per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP): countries with high GDP per capita are required 
to reduce their emissions, while those with lower GDP per capita are allowed increasing 
them.146 The targets adopted as a part of the Package were the same as those initially 
proposed by the Commission. Instead, what were modified during the political negotiations 
leading to the adoption of the Package were the rules applicable to meeting the targets.   
 
The Decision applies to sectors such as transport, heating in buildings and waste. Emissions 
in these sectors tend to be diffuse and have important differences in mitigation potentials, 
which is why Member States may use their discretion as to where to concentrate their efforts. 
It is useful to note that emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) are 
not included in the Package but the Commission was supposed to propose their inclusion 
once the international LULUCF rules have been agreed – alternatively, as currently looks 
likely, the Member States may specify their intentions regarding LULUCF if there is no 
international agreement by the end of 2010.147 In practice, the LULUCF sector is important as 
it accounted for some 8% of the EU’s total emissions in 2008.148 In September 2010, the 
Commission launched public consultations on whether LULUCF should be included in the 
EU’s 20%, or 30%, target.149  
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BE Belgium 22% 13% –15 % 70.954.356 92% 925% 
BG Bulgaria 94% 16% 20% 35.161.279 92%  
CZ Czech Republic 61% 13% 9% 68.739.717 92%  
                                                
145 Decision 406/2009/EC, cited supra note 21. 
146 Ibid., preambular para 8 . See also Commission, “Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s 
greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020” COM(2008) 17 final, 23 Jan. 2008. 
147 Ibid., Art. 8.6. Art. 9 on the Effort-Sharing Decision, cited supra note 21, contains provisions on the 
treatment of LULUCF emissions in the event that there is no international agreement by 31 Dec. 2010. 
148 Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG Clima), Brussels, 10 Sept. 2010. Public consultation on the role 
of EU agriculture and forestry in achieving the EU’s climate change commitments. Background note for public 
consultation <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/consultations/0003/background_climate.pdf> accessed 11 Nov. 2010. 
149 Ibid. 
DK Denmark 170% 30% –20 % 29.868.050 92% 79% 
DE Germany 58% 18% –14 % 438.917.769 92% 79% 
EE Estonia 180% 25% 11% 8.886.125 92%  
IE Ireland 31% 16% –20 % 37.916.451 92% 113% 
EL Greece 69% 18% –4 % 64.052.250 92% 125% 
ES Spain 87% 20% –10 % 219.018.864 92 115% 
FR France 103% 23% –14 % 354.448.112 92% 100% 
IT Italy 52% 17% –13 % 305.319.498 92% 935% 
CY Cyprus 29% 13% –5 % 4.633.210 n/a  
LV Latvia 326% 40% 17% 9.386.920 92%  
LT Lithuania 150% 23% 15% 18.429.024 92%  
LU Luxembourg 9% 11% -20% 8.522.041 92% 72% 
HU Hungary 43% 13% 10% 58.024.562 94%  
MT Malta 0% 10% 5% 1.532.621 n/a  
NL Netherlands 24% 14% –16 % 107.302.767 92% 94% 
AT Austria 233% 34% –16 % 49.842.602 92% 87% 
PL Poland 72% 15% 14% 216.592.037 94%  
PT Portugal 205% 31% 1% 48.417.146 92% 127% 
RO Romania 178% 24% 19% 98.477.458 92%  
SI Slovenia 160% 25% 4% 12.135.860 92%  
SK Slovakia 67% 14% 13% 23.553.300 92%  
FI Finland 285% 38% –16 % 29.742.510 92% 100% 
SE Sweden 398% 49% –17 % 37.266.379 92% 104% 
UK United Kingdom 13% 15% –16 % 310.387.829 92% 87.5% 
 
* Share of energy from renewable sources in gross final consumption of energy, 2005, from Annex I, 
Directive 2009/28/EC. 
** Target for share of energy from renewable sources in gross final consumption of energy, 2020, from 
Annex I, Directive 2009/28/EC. 
+ Relative to 2005. Member State limits in 2020 for greenhouse gas emissions from sources not covered 
under the ETS Directive compared to 2005 greenhouse gas emissions levels. From Annex COM(2008) 
17 final. 
++ The EU ETS cap for 2013 has been determined at 1,926,876,368 allowances, and will annually 
decrease by 35.374.181. The 2012 cap, however, is subject to adjustments. 
§§ Relative to 1990, from Kyoto Protocol. 
§§§ Relative to 1990, from Council Decision 2002/358/EC, 25 April 2002. 
 
Under the Effort-sharing Decision, each Member State must implement its binding annual 
target.150 The target is subject to strict reporting and compliance checks.151 Member States 
that are in non-compliance will be subject to coercive action.152 It is also possible for 
Member States to transfer emission rights among themselves153 or to implement EU-wide 
projects.154  
 
Vedder identifies two international elements in the Effort-sharing Decision: first, as in the 
case of the EU ETS, there is explicit provision for adjustments depending on the evolution of 
the international climate change legal framework; second, Member States are called upon to 
ensure that purchase of credits enhance the equitable geographic distribution of CDM 
projects and achievement of an international agreement on climate change. 155  This 
international dimension relates to the possibility to use carbon credits generated by the CDM 
for which the Effort-sharing Decision contains detailed rules.156 This possibility also ties in 
with EU bilateral external efforts to support the CDM in third countries.157 Indeed, the 
preamble of the Effort-Sharing Decision provides that the Member State should be able to 
use additional credits resulting from agreements concluded between the EU and third 
countries. The interplay between EU domestic law and international action, at the multilateral 
and bilateral level, is also visible in the CCS Directive, which is discussed next. 
 
5. CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE 
A new legal initiative included in the Package, the CCS Directive presents interesting 
international dimensions, particularly with reference to internal environmental integration. 
The latter point is clearly reflected in the purpose of the Directive, which is to establish a 
“legal framework for the environmentally safe geological storage of carbon dioxide to 
contribute to the fight against climate change” and to “eliminate as far as possible negative 
effects and any risk to the environment and human health.”158 The CCS Directive is the 
world’s first example of legislation dedicated to this issue.159 
                                                
150 Ibid., Art. 3 . Essentially, the targets are a linear reduction path. The starting point is based on average 
emissions in 2008-2010 and the end point is in 2020. According to Art. 3.3, banking is possible and a Member 
State may carry forward from the following year a quantity of up to 5 % of its annual emission allocation.  
151 Ibid., Art. 6 and 7.  
152 Ibid., Art. 7. . 
153 Ibid., Art. 3.4, according to which a Member State may also transfer up to 5 % of its annual emission 
allocation to other Member States. 
154 Ibid., Art. 5.7, according to which Member States may use credits from Community-level projects issued 
pursuant to Art. 24a of Directive 2003/87/EC towards their emission reduction commitments, without any 
quantitative limit. 
155 Vedder, see note 8 supra, at 6, referring respectively to Art. 5(1), 8 and 9 of the Effort-sharing Decision, cited 
supra note 21. In this regard, the Effort Sharing Decision limits the annual use of credits to 3% of the Member 
State’s greenhouse gas emissions in 2005, plus a possible additional share of its 3% annual quantity transferred 
by another Member State. See Art. 5.4 and 5.6 of the Effort-Sharing Decision, cited supra note 21. Article 5.5 
contains rather complex criteria according to which certain Member States may use additional credits amounting 
to 1% of their 2005 emissions. 
156 Ibid., Art. 5. 
157 Certain bilateral Association or Partnership and Cooperation Agreements between the EU and third countries 
contain explicit reference to cooperation related to the CDM (see, for instance, Political Dialogue and 
Cooperation Agreement with Central America, Art. 25 < 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ca/pol/pdca_12_03_en.pdf> accessed 11 Nov. 2010). 
158 Art. 1 of Directive 2009/31/EC, cited supra note 22.  
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According to the IPCC, carbon dioxide capture and storage is “a process consisting of the 
separation of CO2 from industrial and energy-related sources, transport to a storage location 
and long-term isolation from the atmosphere.”160 Many argue that CCS holds great promise in 
the fight against climate change: if successful, CCS would decouple CO2 emissions from the 
use of fossil fuels, effectively decarbonising the energy sector. CCS, however, is a non-
demonstrated technology with several question marks surrounding it. As the Directive 
acknowledges:  
 
Each of the different components of CCS, namely capture, transport and storage of 
CO2, has been the object of pilot projects on a smaller scale than that required for 
their industrial application. These components still need to be integrated into a 
complete CCS process, technological costs need to be reduced and more and better 
scientific knowledge has to be gathered. It is therefore important that Community 
efforts on CCS demonstration within an integrated policy framework start as soon as 
possible.” 161 
 
The rationale for the EU legislative initiative on CCS therefore lies both in the recognition 
that global greenhouse gas emissions could not be reduced by 50% by 2050 in a cost-efficient 
manner without CCS, and concerns related to the environmental sustainability of the 
technology.162 The Commission in fact identified in its impact assessment the risk that carbon 
dioxide captures and stored does not remain isolated from the atmosphere and biosphere, 
concluding that land take associated with CCS deployment would be relatively small, and 
that major impacts on biodiversity would result from land fragmentation.163 Nonetheless, CCS 
technology is associated with safety and environmental risks, including leakage, transport and 
sudden release of CO2, which in large quantities could be lethal. Like other large industrial 
installations, there are issues with storage sites, licensing, and public acceptance.164 In 
addition, permanence is an important concern related to CCS, in other words, whether it will 
be possible ensure that the CO2 stored does not find its way back to the atmosphere. Because 
CO2 is stored for the longer-range future, it also has long-term implications, including those 
of inter-generational equity. 165 Others stem from legal and emissions liabilities in case of 
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carbon release.166 For these reasons, Member States have discretion in determining whether to 
make available sites for storage and to identify such sites, as well as to determine the 
conditions for site use. 167    
 
Besides creating an enabling legal framework, the Package also seeks to provide economic 
incentives and encourage the setting up of network of demonstration plants not only across 
Europe but also in key third countries,168 thus also embodying a bilateral external dimension. 
Of particular relevance is a provision of the ETS Directive for setting aside up to 300 million 
EUAs supporting up to 12 CCS demonstration projects. 169 At current EUA prices in the ! 15 
range, 170 this is a EU “subsidy” of about !4500 million, or ! 375 million per demonstration 
project. In addition, the new guidelines on State Aid for environmental protection, 171 
combined with the existence of the CCS Directive, facilitate Member State support for the 
demonstration projects. In particular, the guidelines state that “the means to support [CCS] 
(…) could constitute state aid (…) but it is too early to lay down guidelines relating to the 
authorisation of any such aid. (…) the Commission will have a generally positive attitude 
towards State aid for such projects.”172  
 
In addition to being very costly, CCS demonstration projects face many hurdles, including 
technical, legal, safety and environmental considerations. Proponents of CCS have attempted 
for several years to have the technology, or at least pilot projects, included under the CDM, 
173 in order to secure the necessary financial political support to carry out those projects. 
Those attempts have not been successful so far174 and, at most, the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol have recognized that CCS is a ‘possible mitigation technology’ that raises concerns 
related to outstanding issues related to, inter alia, non-permanence and environmental 
impacts.175 .176Some of the criticism to inclusion of CCS under the CDM has also been based 
on moral grounds, namely that developing countries should not be used as testing grounds for 
unproven technology. Pressure on the EU to legislate on CCS thus originated from various 
sources: part the lack of progress under the UNFCCC; in part the need to show global 
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leadership and address moral concerns; but also industry lobby to allow the first 
demonstration projects and facilitate the long-term commercialization of this technology.  
 
 A. Environmental Integration Dimensions 
The Directive focuses on the regulation of CO2 geological storage,177 providing for the removal 
of unintended barriers in existing legislation (notably, on waste and water).178 It further explains its 
linkages with existing EU environmental law, clarifying that the Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive179 applies to capture180 – given that it presents 
similar risks than chemical and power generation sectors181 – and the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) Directive182 applies to capture and transport, as well as to storage sites183 – 
given that it presents the similar risks to transport of natural gas.184 It is worth recalling that 
EIA outcomes will not necessarily result in specific permit conditions, as the obligation is to 
take them into account185 leaving broad discretion to relevant authorities.186 Furthermore, 
liability for local environmental damage caused by CCS is regulated by the Environmental 
Liability Directive,187  and complemented by the inclusion of storage sites under ETS Directive.188  
 
In terms of internal environmental integration, the regulatory system for CCS is premised on 
a selection of storage sites aiming to ensure the absence of significant risk of leakage and 
significant environmental or health risk.189 The selection is preceded by an assessment taking 
into account proximity of the proposed project site to valuable natural resources, such as 
protected areas included in the Natura 2000 network, potable groundwater and 
hydrocarbons.190 It also includes a risk assessment composed of exposure assessment191 and 
effects assessment,192 as well as other factors that could pose a hazard to human health or the 
environment.193 The central regulatory tool is the storage permit, which is subject to review 
by the Commission leading to a non-binding opinion194 to enhance public confidence.195 The 
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application to obtain the permit needs to include a description of measures to prevent 
‘significant irregularities.’196 (defined as any irregularity in the injection or storage operation 
which implies a risk to the environment or human health197). Permit conditions include 
observance of other relevant EU legislation.198 Environmental safety is further guaranteed by 
the requirement to ensure that no waste or other matter may be added to the CO2 stream, and 
that concentrations of incidental and added substances do not pose a significant risk to the 
environment or breach requirements of other applicable Union law.199 Monitoring to be 
carried out by the operator includes the surrounding environment for the purpose of, inter 
alia, detecting significant adverse effects, in particular to drinking water, human populations 
and users of surrounding biosphere.200 Member States’ competent authorities also check 
compliance with such monitoring obligations. 
 
It should be also noted that provisions on public participation can serve to ensure internal 
environmental integration: in the case of the CCS Directive, a succinct provision on access to 
information201 may facilitate the role of the public as watchdogs for the overall environmental 
sustainability of CCS activities. The requirement for Member States to make publicly 
available environmental information related to the geological storage of CO2202 is coupled 
with public participation requirements under the EIA and IPPC Directives. It is, however, 
doubtful whether sufficient stakeholder involvement is provided for, given that under the EIA 
Directive there is no provision for consultation before environmental information is provided 
by the developer, so that there is no opportunity for public input when the necessity and 
scope of an environmental impact assessment is determined.203   
 
When compared with the minimum guarantees called for by civil society,204 the EU seems to 
have taken on board concerns related to CCS as add-on to energy efficiency, renewables and 
sustainable land use; safe and permanent storage in locations that do not allow leakage or 
gassing out assessed and confirmed through independent scientific review; and avoidance of 
open oceans and sea floor. It remains unclear, however, whether the provisions put in place at 
EU level will also preclude interference or negative direct or indirect impacts on biodiversity, 
given that the EIA Directive is not considered well-equipped to fully take into account 
biodiversity concerns.205 Finally, civil society called for ruling out open aquifers and lakes,206 
which is not reflected in the EU Directive. 
 
B. International dimensions 
There are key international dimensions linked to the legislative effort by the EU to ensure 
internal environmental integration with respect to CCS. CCS is discussed at the international 
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level in several fora.207 In addition to the ongoing discussions under the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol, the 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution 
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972, has been amended to allow CCS in sub-
seabed geological formations.208 The latter development has been explicitly quoted in the 
preamble of the CCS Directive.209 In addition, the EU prohibits storage in the water column 
and beyond the areas under the jurisdiction of its Member States,210 taking on board the 
concerns raised within the Convention on Biological Diversity211 and by the decision of the 
Parties to the OSPAR Convention to prohibit placement of CO2 in the water column and on 
the seabed.212  Furthermore, one of the main purposes of the Directive is to bring a 
‘pioneering” example of domestic legislation inspired by internal environmental integration 
to the multilateral negotiations table as a source of inspiration for the development of 
international law and of national law.213 Indeed, the recent EU214 submission to the UNFCCC 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice stresses that industrialized 
countries can ‘take the lead’ in developing and deploying CCS, mentioning the CCS 
Directive as “a useful example for enabling CCS in other jurisdictions, respecting legal, 
cultural, social and administrative differences.”215 There the EU outlines various suggestions 
for the inclusion of CCS in the CDM, based on its own legal tools for site-selection, 
monitoring, allocation of responsibility to one entity only, EIA (including social aspects - 
although these are not covered by the EU EIA Directive), risk assessment, requirements for 
the composition of CO2 streams, and liability.216 To support its position before the other 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, the EU also explicitly links its available support to developing 
countries in terms of bilateral external action, mentioning its readiness to provide capacity-
building and engage in collaborative research and development, exchange of views on policy 
issues including legal frameworks, as well as opportunities for scientific collaboration 
between EU and non-EU researchers on CCS.217 This reflects the more generic reference to 
technology cooperation with key countries that was made in the CCS Directive preamble.218 
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6. RENEWABLE ENERGY 
In addition to the CCS Directive, provisions emphasising internal environmental integration 
can be found in the Renewables Directive, which has three objectives: environmental 
sustainability, energy security and technology innovation.219 In the context of the Package, it 
seeks to implement the EU’s target of increasing the share of renewable energy to 20% of 
primary energy consumption and 10% of the energy used in the transport sector by 2020. 
This section will first introduce the overall legal scheme to support the achievement of the 
2020 renewables targets, and then discuss more in detail the sustainability criteria for biofuels 
as a salient feature of the Package both in terms of internal environmental integration, as well 
as for their complex international dimensions.  
 
The energy sector is engrained in the fabric of the European Union, dating as far back as the 
European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s. EU legislation on renewable energy 
emerged in the late 1970s as a response to the oil shocks, and was initially conceived as 
distinct from climate change.220  First environmental integration efforts in the EU energy 
policy were made in the context of the fuel quality standards and implicitly in the context of 
energy efficiency standards and research and development programmes. In the 1990s, 
electricity from renewable energy sources was considered in the context of electricity 
liberalization. The 1995 White Paper on an Energy Policy for the European Union221 made 
clear that promotion of energy efficient technologies and energy conservation efforts were 
regarded as action designed to achieve both security of energy supply and environmental 
goals, and the objective of energy security was considered largely compatible with 
environmental integration. On the other hand, the push towards a common energy market was 
less compatible with environmental objectives.222 In the early 2000s, EU legislation was 
adopted on renewable electricity223, fuels224 and heat.225 The EU approach to renewables, 
though, was fragmented, with each sector having its own separate legislation. 
 
Against this background, the Package signalled a shift in approach based on the integrated 
nature and inter-relationships between energy policy (comprising efficiency, security and 
renewables) and climate policy,226 and within renewables, including all sectors under a single 
directive. This shift is also reflected in the new legal basis for the EU policy on energy 
inserted in the TFEU by the Treaty of Lisbon, where “regard for the need to preserve and 
improve the environment” is called for in all aspects of energy policy, namely: ensuring the 
functioning of the energy market; ensuring security of energy supply in the Union; promoting 
energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of 
energy; and promoting the interconnection of energy networks.227 It should be noted that the 
TFEU has not changed the unanimity rule required for adopting measures that affect Member 
States’ sources and structure of energy supply.228 
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The overall legal framework supporting achievement of the 2020 target for renewable energy 
comprises five elements: obligatory national targets for 2020; national renewable energy 
action plans; flexible mechanisms allowing for cross-financing between Member States for 
the achievement of the EU target;229 administrative and regulatory reforms; as well as 
biofuels sustainability criteria.230 For the first time, Member States are to coordinate their 
approaches to a range of planning, certification and educational issues associated with the 
renewable energy sector (on the basis of both obligatory provisions and recommendations), 
against a new single target.231 The targets must be consistent with a target of at least 20% 
share of energy from renewable sources in the EU’s gross final energy consumption in 2020, 
which should be achieved also through energy efficiency and energy saving.232 The legally 
binding and differentiated national targets for each Member States (see Table 1) represent a 
notch up in ambition from previously “indicative” targets, for example in Directive 
2001/77/EC.233 The national action plans are to determine sectoral targets for the share of 
energy from renewables consumed in transport, electricity, heating and cooling in 2020 and 
the measures to be taken to achieve national overall targets.234  .It seems all Member States 
are on track to achieve them. The targets are coupled with the obligation for each Member 
State to achieve at least 10% of renewable energy consumption in the transport sector.235  
 
As mentioned above, the Renewables Directive introduced flexible mechanisms aimed at 
facilitating the achievement of the 20% target. While most of the mechanisms focus on 
cooperation between the Member States, they also make it possible to count electricity 
purchased from third countries against the national target of a Member States. Article 6 
enables statistical transfers between Member States. This mechanism can be compared to 
international emissions trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol whereby one country 
transfers part of its emissions quota to another country. Under Article 7, two or more Member 
States can also implement joint projects, which may involve private parties, that relate to the 
production of energy from renewable electricity, heating or cooling.236 This mechanism is 
similar to Joint Implementation under Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, which enables two 
countries with emission reduction targets to implement climate-friendly projects and agree on 
the transfer of the ensuing emission reductions. Article 11 of the Renewables Directive also 
makes it possible to create joint support schemes, whereby two or more Member States may 
decide to join or partly coordinate their national support schemes, and a certain amount of 
renewable energy produced in the territory of one participating Member State may count 
towards the national target of another Member State.237 
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An international dimension to the Renewables Directive emerges from the third mechanism 
under Article 9, which focuses on joint projects between EU Member States and third 
countries. 238 While this provision will be of limited practical relevance to meet the 2020 
targets, it establishes a framework for third-country projects which may be important to meet 
targets beyond 2020, and represents a lifeline to projects such as DESERTEC,239 which is 
trying to deploy renewable electricity capacity in North Africa for European consumption. 
This mechanism has elements resembling the CDM established under the Kyoto Protocol, 
which allows developed countries to benefit from carbon credits generated in developing 
countries. It reinforces the international dimension of the Package and allows third countries 
to access finance for renewables infrastructure.240 However, according to recent estimates by 
the Commission, the flexibility mechanisms will not play a major role in meeting the 
renewable energy target: only five Member States are not expected to meet their targets 
exclusively with domestic sources and only 1% of energy is expected to be traded between 
Member States or third countries.241 It should further be noted that a standard clause in most 
Association and Partnership/Cooperation Agreements between the EU and third countries or 
regions systematically call for cooperation in renewables.242 Thus, the EU has an additional 
legal basis, enshrined in an international bilateral treaty, for specifically supporting 
renewables in third countries: this type of clause may allow the EU to support the 
implementation of key provisions of the Renewables Directive beyond its borders, with the 
consent of the third country/region involved. The international dimension of the Renewables 
Directive becomes even more evident when focusing attention on its unprecedented 
sustainability criteria for the production of biofuels, discussed next. 
7. Biofuels sustainability criteria 
Biofuels have been in the international spotlight for several reasons, including concerns 
regarding food security, adverse environmental impacts and deforestation, additional pressure 
on dwindling land and water resources, potential negative effects on indigenous and local 
communities and small-holder farmers, as well as introduction and spread of genetically 
modified organisms or of invasive alien species.243 In addition, the debate still continues on 
whether the use of biofuels reduces greenhouse gases and to what extent if the whole 
lifecycle analysis is considered.  
 
To address those concerns, and to ensure that biofuels promoted by the Package avoided 
negative environmental impacts, particularly deforestation and loss of biodiversity, the EU 
introduced sustainability criteria - one of the most innovative features of the package.244 
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These criteria are also reflected in the Fuel Specification Directive, which includes, verbatim, 
all language from the Renewables Directive applicable to biofuels.245  
 
The decision of the EU to adopt pioneering legislation containing sustainability criteria for 
biofuels should be placed in the broader context of ongoing negotiations in various 
multilateral fora on possible international standards in this respect.246 In the context of the 
CBD, specifically, entrenched positions have been presented as to whether international 
standards should be developed to ensure maximizing the positive and minimizing the 
negative impacts of biofuels on the environment, biodiversity and local and indigenous 
communities.247 In 2008, Parties to the CBD agreed that biofuel production and use should be 
sustainable in relation to biological diversity through the development and application of 
sound policy frameworks, research and monitoring of the positive and negative impacts of 
the production and use of biofuels on biodiversity and related socio-economic aspects, 
including those related to indigenous and local communities; strengthened development 
cooperation with a view to promote the sustainable production and use of biofuels; and 
encouraging the private sector to improve social and environmental performance of the 
production of biofuels.248 The EU continues to support the development of international 
standards at the CBD,249 mentioning its own sustainability criteria as a relevant example in 
that respect. This subsection will in turn look into the environmental integration aspects of 
the criteria, as well as their international dimension both in terms of WTO law compatibility 
and of inclusion in the EU bilateral external action. 
 
a) Environmental integration 
Similarly to the CCS Directive, the EU seems to have adopted legislation on biofuels with a 
view to showing leadership on a controversial issue. The EU domestic provisions represent 
an attempt to ensure internal environmental integration with a view to providing a good-
practice example to other countries for action at the national level or to influence 
international negotiations.  
 
The selection of criteria is purposely based on explicit references to MEAs and related 
international processes. Specifically, the criteria are land-related (concerning land with high 
biodiversity value and land with high carbon stock), which fulfill the internal dimension of 
the environmental integration principle, and on greenhouse gas emission savings (of at least 
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35%250), which contribute towards environmental integrity. While these two sets of criteria 
apply both to imported biofuels and to those produced within the EU, an additional criteria of 
cross-compliance applies only to the latter. Thus, for biofules produced within the EU, the 
Directive requires compliance with existing requirements under EU environmental law for 
agriculture, including protection of groundwater and surface water quality and social 
requirements.251  
 
With regards to biodiversity concerns, the Directive requires that biofuels and bioliquids must 
not be made from raw material obtained from land with high biodiversity value, namely: land 
that in or after January 2008 has the status of primary forest (according to the definition used 
by the FAO in its Global Forest Resource Assessment; and252) protected areas, unless 
evidence is provided that the production of that raw material did not interfere with those 
nature protection purposes, or highly biodiverse grassland.253 With regards to non-natural 
highly biodiverse grasslands, an exception is possible if harvesting of raw material was 
necessary to preserve the area’s grassland status.254 In addition, the Directive’s preamble 
points to the possibility for the Commission to take due account of the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment255 – the first scientific assessment of the consequences of ecosystem 
change on human well-being undertaken in 2005 - which contains useful data for the 
conservation of at least those areas that provide basic ecosystem services in critical situations 
such as watershed protection and erosion control.256 For other biodiversity dimensions that 
are not explicitly covered by the sustainability criteria, the Directive provides complementary 
monitoring requirements: Member States are to report on estimated impacts of biofuels 
production on biodiversity, water resources, water quality and soil quality within their 
territories,257 while the Commission is expected to report on possible broader impacts in 
Member States and third countries that are a significant source of raw material for biofuels 
consumed within the Union as to their ratification and implementation of the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety and the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered 
Species.258 
 
Another relevant criteria at the intersection of biodiversity and climate change concerns is the 
prohibition to derive biofuels from raw material obtained from land with high carbon stock, 
namely land that had in January 2008 and no longer has that status of wetlands (as defined in 
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the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance259), or continuously forested areas or 
areas with 10-30% canopy cover.260 Using such land for biofuels production would result in a 
negative net greenhouse gas emission reduction impact given that CO2 is released into the 
atmosphere as a result of land conversion261 The Commission has indicated that monitoring 
compliance with land-related criteria can take the form of aerial photographs, satellite 
images, maps, land register entries and site surveys.262 
 
While noting the importance of broader land use issues,263 the final compromise did not 
provide for the inclusion of other environmental or social concerns in the sustainability 
criteria, but rather to task the Commission with biannual reports on the impact on social 
sustainability in the EU and in third countries of increased demand for biofuel, on the impact 
of the EU’ biofuel policy on the availability of foodstuffs at affordable prices, in particular 
for people living in developing countries, and wider development issues, including the 
respect of land-use rights and implementation of listed human rights and labour 
conventions.264 Thus, the matter is kept under review for the time being, with the possibility 
in the short-term (2012) for the Commission to propose ‘corrective action, in particular if 
evidence shows that biofuels production has a significant impact on food prices.’ 265 
Similarly, the Commission is to report in 2012 and propose corrective action as to whether it 
would be ‘feasible and appropriate to introduce mandatory requirements in relation to air, soil 
and water protection, taking into account the latest scientific evidence and the EU 
international obligations.’266 This more cautious approach certainly reflects current impasses 
in multilateral negotiations, where discussions of social issues related to biofules, such as 
land tenure and food prices, as well as impacts on indigenous and local communities, remain 
very controversial.267 
 
Provisions on public participation may also be instrumental in ensuring internal 
environmental integration. The Renewables Directive requires that the Member States ensure 
public information on the availability and environmental benefits of all different renewable 
sources of energy for transport. When the percentages of biofuels, blended in mineral oil 
derivatives, exceed 10% by volume, Member States shall require this to be indicated at the 
sales points.268 In addition, the Commission is to create an online public transparency 
platform to facilitate and promote cooperation between Member States and make public 
relevant information that the Commission or a Member State deems to be of key importance 
to the Directive and to the achievement of its objectives,269 but no specific mention of the 
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sustainability biofuels criteria. The Commission has also stressed that although the Directive 
does not require Member States to make information public, they are encouraged to publish 
biofuels sustainability information in a consistent manner for all fuels, taking into account 
possible commercially sensitive character of a company’s specific information.270 
 
b) WTO law compatibility 
During the Directive’s preparatory process, a number of developing countries raised concerns 
over the compatibility of the planned biofuels sustainability criteria with WTO law, 
highlighting they could violate Article 2 of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade and impose “unjustifiably complex requirements on producers” and “impinge 
disproportionately on developing countries.”271 They also argued that the criteria could 
violate the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, including its Article XX because they 
distort international trade without suitable scientific justification or the support of 
international treaties.272 Indeed, given that the sustainability criteria also apply to imported 
biofules, they can be expected to have practical implications on production in third countries 
wishing to export biofuels to the growing markets in the EU - which, as discussed above, is 
the Directive’s intention. In principle, sustainability standards seeking to impact land use in 
foreign countries would seem to surface questions concerning WTO law and point towards 
the long-standing and controversial debate on the permissibility of trade measures triggered 
by the way in which a product is produced.273 
 
However, the Commission was aware of the international trade implications of the 
sustainability criteria and the argument can also be made that the WTO aspect has been taken 
into consideration when drafting the Renewables Directive and, according to Scott, “those 
familiar with the contours of WTO law will perceive in the text of the Renewables Directive 
efforts to align the scope and application of the sustainability criteria with the multiple 
requirements of WTO law.”274 In other words, the criteria: apply to domestic and imported 
products; contain a range of qualifications and exceptions in a bid to ensure that they are no 
more trade-restrictive than necessary; make recourse to international standards where 
possible; and are cognisant of the importance of WTO- imposed due process demands.275 
From the point of view of WTO law, it is also relevant to note that compliance with the sustainability 
criteria is not a precondition for placing biofules on the EU market, although in practice it makes them 
uncompetitive as they cannot be counted against the 10% target. In other words, lack of compliance 
with these criteria does not lead to a ban on imports or use within the EU, but rather to a series of 
disincentives. 276  Specifically non-compliant biofuels are ineligible for: meeting the biofuels 
targets277; compliance with renewable energy obligations;278 receiving biofuels consumption financial 
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support;279 meeting the Fuel Quality Directive GHG emissions reductions targets;280 investment 
and/or operating aid in accordance with the Guidelines on state aid for environmental 
protection;281 and the provisions for alternative-fuel vehicles.282 
 
It should be noted that in February 2010 the Commission indicated that it did not intend to 
recommend binding sustainability criteria for solid biomass and biogas used in electricity, 
heating and cooling, but suggest voluntary criteria for Member States to include on national 
schemes, with the possibility to review this decision in 2011283 given that the relevant impact 
assessment indicated that ‘no policy tool can give certainty that forests will be regenerated 
after biomass is harvested.’284  
Member States are expected to check operators’ compliance285 with the sustainability criteria 
via three methods: a national system – i.e. requesting operators to provide national authorities 
with data on compliance286 subject to independent auditing of the information submitted;287 a 
voluntary scheme recognized by the Commission for that purpose;288 or a bilateral or 
multilateral agreement concluded by the EU, recognized by the Commission for this 
purpose.289  While national systems will be based on the default values set by the Renewables 
Directive to show compliance with the GHG emission savings, the other two systems may also 
cover other sustainability issues that are not covered by the Directive.290 
 
c) Bilateral external dimension 
Not only are the sustainability criteria systematically invoked by the EU in multilateral 
negotiations on biofuels,291 but they also have a bilateral international dimension. Motivated 
by the concern that biofuels production in third countries might not respect minimum 
environmental or social requirements and the aim to promote the production of biofuels and 
bioliquids worldwide in a sustainable manner,292 the Directive indicates that the EU will 
endeavour to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements with third countries containing 
provisions on the sustainability criteria.293  This could also be seen in the context of WTO 
law: in the Shrimp-Turtle case it was found that the US (unsuccessful) bilateral negotiations 
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with countries targeted by its environmental trade restrictions were relevant for determining 
WTO law compatibility of the measure.294 To this end, the Directive specifically requires due 
consideration for measures taken for the conservation of areas that provide in critical 
situations basic ecosystem services and states that the Commission may also recognize areas 
for the protection of ecosystems or species protected by international agreements for the 
purposes of taking into account land, labour and additional environmental concerns not 
covered by the sustainability criteria, or included in lists drawn up by intergovernmental 
organizations or The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) for the purposes 
of fulfilling the high biodiversity value land criteria.295 In addition, the Directive calls upon 
the Commission to maintain a dialogue and exchange information with third countries and 
biofuels producers, consumer organizations and civil society concerning the general 
implementation of the Directive, and in particular the impact of biofuels production on food 
prices.296 Finally, the Commission is required to monitor the origin of biofuels and the 
impacts of their production on land use in third countries of supply with a view to analyzing 
the impact of increased demand for biofuels on sustainability in these countries, considering 
economic and environmental impacts, including on biodiversity 
 
This is reflected in the external action instruments used by the EU in its relations with third 
countries..297 While specific cooperation on biofuels is not mentioned in the Association and 
Partnership/Cooperation Agreement between the EU and third countries (beyond what can be 
implied by more generic obligations on cooperation on renewables mentioned above), the 
Sustainability Impact Assessments that assess the trade component of the Union agreements 
with third countries to address trade-offs between economic growth and its environment and 
social impacts, have in some instances, included certification for biofuels among policy 
recommendation to ensure sustainability298 or even more specifically made reference to the 
Renewables Directive and its criteria as guidance for third countries.299 
 
Overall, the sustainability criteria for biofuels clearly take into account a great variety of 
environmental concerns in an attempt to satisfy internal environmental integration. They do 
so, however, in a phased approach, that has prioritized certain biodiversity concerns and 
allows for early review to reflect progress in multilateral negotiations. This is tightly linked to 
the international dimensions of the Package, as the EU actively promotes such a holistic 
approach to biofuels showcasing its sustainability criteria not only through its interventions in 
relevant multilateral fora, but also through its bilateral relations. It remains to be seen how 
effective the criteria will be in third countries, given the reliance on economic operators and 
independent auditors for its enforcement, and the oversight role left for the Commission 
considering its limited resources for fulfilling its monitoring obligations.300 It has also been 
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noted that corrective measures envisaged by the Directive in case of negative reports on 
sustainability in third countries will most likely entail a policy declaration, to avoid any WTO 
law incompatibility issues.301 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
This analysis shows that the contribution of the EU’s Climate and Energy Package to the goal 
of environmental integration is, at least on paper, significant. The EU has attempted to 
mainstream climate change considerations into a range of sectors (external environmental 
integration), which is necessary given the multitude of activities and actors that must be 
engaged to effectively mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. The EU ETS plays an important 
role in this regard as setting a price for greenhouse gas emissions is commonly viewed as one 
of the most important mitigation tools.302 The Package has contributed to this objective, first, 
by affirming that emissions trading will continue in the EU regardless of international climate 
policy developments and possible second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. The 
Package has also extended the carbon price signal by broadening the scope of the ETS both 
in terms of activities and greenhouse gases covered. Finally, the Package has also provided 
more certainty concerning the scale of emission reductions required in the ETS sector by 
including in the Directive provisions on a linearly declining, EU-wide emissions cap. As 
discussed above, however, setting the price signal and emissions cap at the right level has 
proven difficult - without new measures for the third trading period, the effectiveness of the 
ETS in promoting low-emissions investment is questionable. Binding emission reduction 
targets for Member States in sectors not covered by the ETS, through the Effort-sharing 
Decision, also contribute to external environmental integration, as do measures to implement 
the 20% energy efficiency target. For example, car manufacturers have been subjected to a 
binding obligation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from their average fleet.  In addition, 
the tighter links between the EU climate policy and energy policy certainly contribute to 
climate change mainstreaming in several sectors.  
 
Through the Package, the EU has also attempted to “increase positive and reduce negative 
impacts of climate change mitigation and adaptation measures on biodiversity”,303 consistent 
with the internal dimension of environmental integration.  The most obvious examples of 
internal integration in the Package are the legal tools chosen to ensure the environmental 
sustainability of CCS projects and the sustainability criteria for biofuels. The CCS Directive 
is remarkable in that it is the first piece of legislation in the world aiming to create a legal 
framework for environmentally safe CCS projects. The Directive promotes internal 
integration, inter alia, through links to other EU environmental legislation, such as the IPPC 
and EIA Directives, to ensure that broader environmental considerations are taken into 
account when using CCS to mitigate climate change. As to biofules, the 10% renewable 
energy target in the transport sector was perhaps the most controversial element of the 
Package with strong concerns voiced concerning its environmental and social implications. 
This led to the inclusion in the Package of detailed sustainability criteria for both EU 
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produced and imported biofuels. The sustainability criteria provide a clear example of 
internal integration as they attempt to ensure that the production of biofules in the EU or in 
foreign countries does not lead to biodiversity loss304 while also achieving a minimum level 
of greenhouse gas emission savings305 The analysis of the Package through the lens of the 
environmental integration principle has thus helped to explain the EU’s efforts to play a 
global leadership role in the fight against climate change through its attempts to use the 
Package to influence multilateral negotiations, such as under the CBD and Kyoto Protocol, to 
ensure that also other relevant international regimes reflect environmental integration. In 
addition, the EU clearly expects the Package to act as models for other countries on an 
individual basis.  
 
Against this background, the Package clearly reflects the EU’s desire to pioneer innovative 
and sustainable responses to climate change. Under the UNFCCC negotiations, the EU has 
frequently highlighted elements of the Package and encouraged other Parties to adopt similar 
measures. The interdependence of the international and European dimensions is also reflected 
in the way EU legislation is drafted with direct references to international instruments and 
notable review clauses in the Package linked to developments in ongoing international 
negotiations.306 However, the internationalizing approach to European law-making has also 
surfaced questions concerning the compatibility of parts of the Package with WTO law. This 
concerns especially provisions related to carbon leakage and the possible carbon equalizer 
system in the context of the EU ETS and the biofuels sustainability criteria in the Renewables 
Directive. The idea of requiring developing country importers to purchase credits under the 
ETS has also surfaced concerns over its compatibility with the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities under the UNFCCC. Both have also been recognised by the 
Commission. It has been argued that EU’s efforts to influence global developments through 
its internal environmental legislation can be seen as a strategy to shield EU law from WTO 
challenges by putting pressure on other jurisdictions to adopt similar environmental 
legislation and/or adopt corresponding international standards, thus protecting the 
competitive interests of European companies that have to comply with high-standard 
environmental regulation.307 However, another explanation is that for the EU to fulfil its 
environmental integration principle and its objective of pursuing global solutions to climate 
change, the main driver of the globalization of EU law is that of promoting holistic 
environmental multilateralism with the secondary effect of ‘running the risk” of WTO law 
incompatibility. The present analysis of the key elements of the Package (particularly 
concerning carbon leakage and sustainability criteria for biofuels) reveals how the EU 
carefully calculates such risk and attempts to avoid solutions that would be clearly 
incompatible with the WTO Agreements. 
 
This article has also highlighted some of the complex and increasingly more explicit 
interactions between both the EU’s position under multilateral fora and its domestic 
legislation with the EU’s bilateral external relations. Bilateral relations are used by the EU to 
support the implementation of multilateral environmental obligations in third countries 
(particularly developing ones), as well as to create or strengthen alliances with third countries 
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with a view to influencing ongoing multilateral negotiations.308 This usually builds on the 
environmental cooperation clauses that can be found in the various Association, Cooperation 
and Partnerships Agreements concluded by the EU with third countries,309 which are usually 
coupled with significant development cooperation and policy dialogue.310 They can be seen as 
a necessary complement to EU ambitious domestic action on climate change, with a view to 
fulfilling the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. While it is difficult at 
this stage to assess the extent to which EU bilateral relations are effectively contributing to 
mainstreaming climate change in other policy areas and supporting holistic and 
environmentally sustainable responses to climate change in third countries, it can be stated 
that these interactions are likely to increase in the near future:311 in the wake of the UN 
Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, the European Parliament adopted a resolution 
calling for mainstreaming climate change in bilateral external relations;312 and, in the second 
revision of the Cotonou Agreement – the world’s largest economic and political framework 
for North-South cooperation, involving seventy-nine African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries – the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries recognize for the 
first time the global challenge of climate change as a major subject for their partnership, 
committing to raise the profile of climate change in their development cooperation, and to 
support ACP countries’ mitigation and adaptation efforts.313 As pointed out in the previous 
sections, this bilateral external dimension is increasingly reflected in the way EU ‘domestic’ 
                                                
308 For a detailed discussion, see Morgera and Marín Durán, Environmental Integration in the EU External 
Relations: Beyond Multilateral Dimensions (Hart, forthcoming 2011). In the specific context of climate change, 
see Piebalgs, European Commissioner for development, “ACP-EU Parliamentary Assembly” (Speech at the 
ACP-EU Parliamentary Assembly, Tenerife 29 Mar. 2010) <http://europa-eu-
un.org/articles/en/article_9631_en.htm> accessed 10 Nov. 2010, where Piebalgs proposed increasing 
cooperation in the area of climate change under the ACP-EU framework, and increased policy dialogue on 
climate change, to better understand needs and expectations, share positions, and possibly promote convergence 
of visions ahead of the next UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in Cancun, Mexico, at the end of 2010. 
309 References to cooperation in the specific field of climate change can be found at: Art. 54, Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement with Kazakhstan (28 Jul. 1999); and Art. 103, Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
with Croatia (28 Jan. 2005). Otherwise, more general cooperation clauses on global environmental issues or on 
the implementation of MEAs that parties to the Agreement are parties to can also serve this purpose. 
310 Marín Durán and Morgera, “Towards environmental integration in the European Community’s external 
relations? An analysis of selected association Agreements” 6 YEEL (2006), 179-210. In terms of climate-
specific external initiatives of the EU, see Commission, EU Action Plan on Climate Change and Development, 
COM(2003) 85 final, 11 Mar. 2003; Commission, “Building a global climate change alliance between the 
European Union and poor developing countries most vulnerable to climate change” (Communication) 
COM(2007) 540 final, 18 Sept. 2007; and funding for both in the Thematic Programme for environmental and 
sustainable management of natural resources including energy, COM(2006) 20 final, 25 Jan. 2006. For an 
overview, see Ayers, Huq and Chandani, “Assessing EU assistance for adaptation to climate change in 
developing countries: a Southern perspective” in Oberthür and Pallemaerts, cited  supra note 2, pp. 231-250, 
especially pp. 236-237. 
311 Morgera, “Relevance Beyond Borders…, cited supra note 31. 
312 European Parliament resolution on the outcome of the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change, 10 Feb. 
2010, para 7, where it “urged the EU to agree on a 'Roadmap for Mexico' which will include the discussion of 
climate policies in every strategic partnership and bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreement in order to 
create a more coherent external climate protection strategy.” 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-
0019+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> accessed 11 Nov. 2010. 
313 See “Renewed impetus in the fight against poverty: EU and ACP states initial revised Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement” (EU Press Release) (19 Mar. 2010) <http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_9596_en.htm> 
accessed 10 Nov. 2010, and Second revision of the Cotonou Agreement – agreed consolidated text, (11 Mar. 
2009), preambular para 13bis and Arts. 1, 11(1), 20(2), 29(3)(a) and 32 bis – the latter is a whole new article 
devoted specifically to climate change cooperation, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/second_revision_cotonou_agreement_20100311.pdf> 
accessed 11 Nov. 2010. 
law is framed and implemented, as demonstrated by references to bilateral agreements and 
initiatives with third countries in the Package, such as those related to climate funding and the 
expansion of the global carbon market under the EU ETS Directive, capacity building and 
collaborative research under the CCS Directive, joint projects under the Renewables 
Directive and cooperation on the biofuels sustainability criteria. 
 
The overall conclusion is that the Package represents an innovative and comprehensive 
approach, aiming to integrate climate change considerations into various economic sectors 
and activities within the EU, while at the same time ensuring that climate change mitigation 
is compatible with other environmental objectives. Such an integrative approach is important 
given the scale of the economic and social transformation needed in the coming decades to 
avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change. At the same time, it is clear that the targets 
underlying the Package are not ambitious enough to effectively combat climate change, to 
secure the environmental sustainability of climate change measures, or to achieve a radical 
transformation of the EU’s economy. As explained above, this is well-known to the 
Commission and the Member States, and the possibility of the EU increasing its emission 
reduction target from 20% to 30% from 1990 levels by 2020 is currently being debated.314 
Under the UNFCCC negotiations, the EU has certainly come under pressure from developing 
countries and environmental NGOs to implement the 30% target, which is more in line with 
the requirements of climate science than the current 20% target, and would also convey a 
stronger message of the EU’s global leadership in the fight against climate change. From the 
point of view EU domestic law, a decision to implement the 30% target would require further 
policies and measures, as the Package in its present form is only designed to achieve the EU’s 
unilateral 20% target. In any case, it is clear that far more ambitious emission cuts and 
measures will be needed between now and 2050 for the EU to achieve its objective of cutting 
greenhouse gas emissions by 85% or more by 2050. Equally, the legal tools deployed by the 
EU to prevent or minimize possible negative environmental impacts of climate change 
mitigation measures, such as the phased approach to the sustainability criteria for biofuels 
production, represent an initial step, that may well anticipate action by other countries, but 
that nonetheless remain limited. To this effect, the Package constitutes a good starting point 
but deeper integration of climate change considerations into various economic sectors, 
coupled with stronger guarantees for the environmental sustainability of climate change 
measures, will be required.  
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